Detail zprávy

Public Talk: Michele Valsecchi (New Economic School, Moskva)

28.05.2018

Dovolujeme si vás pozvat na mimořádnou přednášku „Ethnic Geography, Ethnic Favoritism and the Economics of Ethnic Diversity“ od Michela Valsecchiho z New Economic School v Moskvě (NES).

Michele Valsecchi působil jako post-doc na LSE a jako konzultant pro Světovou banku. V roce 2013 získal cenu pro mladého ekonoma od Econometric Society a publikoval v předním světovém časopise na rozvojovou ekonomii Journal of Development Eocnomics.  Nyní je odborným asistentem na New Economic School v Moskvě, kde vyučují absolventi nejlepších světových škol, včetně Harvardu a MIT.

Přednáška se uskuteční 31. května od 13:00 v místnosti 109.

Ethnic Geography, Ethnic Favoritism and the Economics of Ethnic Diversity. 

The effects of ethnic geography, i.e., the distribution of ethnic groups across space, on economic, political and social outcomes are not well understood. First, Michele Valsecchi will review some recent work focusing on the reduced form relationship between ethnic geography, quality of institutions and socio-economic outcomes. Second, the guest speaker will review some recent work on whether the researchers do observe ethnic favoritism around the world (i.e., beyond Africa) and what might be the motives driving it. Finally, Michele Valsecchi will discuss some more studies on the economics of ethnic diversity and suggest some avenues for further research.

V pondělí 4. června se pak od 14:00 v učebně 105 pro zájemce uskuteční seminář, kde bude  Michele Valsecchi prezentovat výsledky svého článku.

Corrupt Bureaucrats: The Response of Non-Elected Officials to Electoral Accountability

Modern state bureaucracies are designed to be insulated from political interference. Successful insulation implies that politicians' electoral incentives do not affect bureaucrats' corruption. The author tests this prediction by assembling a unique dataset on corruption, promotions and demotions for more than 4 million Indonesian local civil servants. To identify the effect of reelection incentives, the author exploits the existence of term limits and a difference-in-difference strategy. He finds that, in districts where politicians can run for reelection, bureaucrats' corruption is 38 percent lower than in districts where they cannot, and that the effect is driven by both top and lower level bureaucrats, which constitutes new evidence of the deep, far-reaching effects of politicians' accountability on local civil servants. Robustness tests, including placebo estimates, the control for politicians' ability and restricting the sample to close elections, support the main findings. The author then explores a mechanism where bureaucrats have career concerns and politicians facing reelection manipulate such concerns by increasing the turnover of top bureaucrats. Consistent with this mechanism, he finds that reelection incentives increase demotions of top bureaucrats and promotions of administrative bureaucrats.

 

Autor - Mgr. Lucie Křížová M.A.

Červenec 2018
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Deloitte
McKinsey & Company
Moneta Money Bank

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