

Individuální studijní plán studentů doktorského studia na IES

Kontaktní údaje

Jméno a příjmení	Lenka Gregorová
Školní rok nástupu studia	2006/2007
Forma studia	Prezenční
Školitel	Prof. RNDr. František Turnovec, CSc.
Téma doktorské práce	Fiscal centralization and decentralization

Předpokládaný harmonogram zkoušek (kód/název/semestr)

2006/2007
ETPM/Economic Theory of Political Markets/zimní
ETPM/Economic Theory of Political Markets/letní
2007/2008
ETPM/Economic Theory of Political Markets/zimní
ETPM/Economic Theory of Political Markets/letní
2008/2009
ETPM/Economic Theory of Political Markets/zimní
ETPM/Economic Theory of Political Markets/letní
Státní doktorská zkouška
2009/2010
ETPM/Economic Theory of Political Markets/zimní
malá obhajoba
velká obhajoba

Předpokládaný harmonogram výuky (kód/název/semestr)

2006/2007
EM003/Advanced Microeconomics I/zimní
EM013/Advanced Microeconomics II/letní
EM080/Public Choice Theory/letní
2007/2008
EM003/Advanced Microeconomics I/zimní
EM013/Advanced Microeconomics II/letní
EM080/Public Choice Theory/letní
2008/2009
EM003/Advanced Microeconomics I/zimní
EM080/Public Choice Theory/letní

Práce na disertaci

Synopse (1- 2 strany)

Dissertation thesis shall carry on my previous research on de/centralization from the perspective of public economics and political economy. This line of research is motivated by ongoing integration of Europe, wherein the scope of decentralization turns to be an utmostly relevant topic. Most prominently, the European Union has spelt out the principle of subsidiarity, yet lacks clearly defined criteria of desirable centralization. Also the nation states understate substantial changes with regard to their fiscal federalism schemes. I aim to use microeconomic and game theoretic tools to build-up models reflecting trade-offs between centralized and decentralized political decision making. The models shall incorporate standard political economy factors, such as bargaining rules, lobbying and strategic delegation effects. Specifically, strategic delegation as a relatively recent research subject shall be considered, as it affects the welfare comparison of centralization and decentralization. In the empirical part of research, I plan to test some of the models using available evidence from decentralized states.

The research shall focus on three topics: the standard welfare comparison of centralization and decentralization, the role of strategic delegation, and the factors behind choice of centralization. There is a vast amount of literature dealing with the first topic, starting from Oates (1972) illustrating that

centralization can lead to suboptimal policies. Ellingsen (1998) explained the cost of centralization in policy domains where public good levels cannot be differentiated by preferences of jurisdictions. Persson and Tabellini (1994) studied centralization with non-uniform levels of provision, and revealed free-rider incentives leading to federal overspending. Lockwood (2005) explored further effects speaking in favor of decentralization, such as higher reference-matching and government accountability.

The second topic draws on Besley and Coate (1997), who analyzed the strategic delegation in the case of cooperative decisions. They show that voters may have incentive to elect candidate with different preferences from their own, if it coincides with their optimizing behaviour. Later, Besley and Coate (2003) illustrated the trade-off between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods in the case of spillovers and illustrated that under particular assumptions, voters will elect public good lovers. Overprovision of public goods thus occurs. Dur and Roelfsema (2005) extend this analysis by allowing for non-shareable costs in the centralized public goods provision and show that under certain conditions, voters delegate rather conservatives than public good lovers. Consequently, there will be the underprovision of public goods. Jennings and Roelfsema (2004) apply this analysis to "conspicuous" public goods. Roelfsema (2006) specifically considers the strategic delegation in the case of central banking. Another application of strategic delegation provides Brueckner (2001), who investigated the political economy effects of tax competition and tax coordination.

Thirdly, centralization can be made endogenous, which opens an array of theoretical possibilities. Redoano and Scharf (2004) have compared centralization under alternative democratic choice procedures – direct democracy and representative democracy – and conclude that centralization is more likely to occur if the choice to centralize is made by elected policymakers than by referendum. Schnellebach (2006) yields the similar conclusion in a slightly different setup.

Základní literatura

Besley, T. and Coate, S. (1997). An economic model of representative democracy. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112 (1), 85-114.

Besley, T. and Coate, S. (2003). Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: A political economy analysis. *Journal of Public Economics* 87 (12), 2611-2637.

Brueckner, M. (2001). Strategic delegation and international capital taxation. Center for European Integration Studies, Working Paper B22 2001.

Dur, R. and Roelfsema, H. (2005). Why does centralization fail to internalize policy externalities? *Public Choice* 122, 395-416.

Ellingsen, T. (1998). Externalities vs. internalities: A model of political integration. *Journal of Public Economics* 68, 251-268.

Jennings, C. and Roelfsema, H. (2004). Conspicuous public goods and leadership selection. Utrecht School of Economics, Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute, Discussion Paper Series 04-10.

Lockwood, B. (2005). Fiscal decentralization: A political economy perspective. University of Warwick, Working paper 721.

Oates, W.E. (1972). *Fiscal federalism*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Oates, W. (2005). Toward A Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism. *International Tax and Public Finance*, 12, 349-373.

Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (1994). Does centralization increase the size of government? *European Economic Review* 38, 765-773.

Redoano, M. and Scharf, K. A. (2004). The political economy of policy centralization: direct versus representative democracy. *Journal of Public Economics* 88, 799-817.

Roelfsema, H. (2004). Strategic delegation of environmental policy making. Utrecht School of Economics, Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute, Discussion Paper Series 04-11.

Schnellenbach, J. (2006). Rent Extraction, Political institutions and the Centralization of Public Goods Provision. Paper presented at the Annual meeting of European Public Choice Society, Turku, (20-23 April).

Harmonogram prací

2006/2007

Práce na prvním článku. Spolupráce na grantu GAČR Ekonomická teorie politických trhů.

2007/2008

Práce na druhém článku. Na podzim 2007 podání žádosti o grant u GA UK. Řešení grantu GA UK.

2008/2009
Dokončení disertace. Řešení grantu GA UK.
2009/2010
Obhajoba disertační práce

Předpokládaná publikace výsledků

2006
Příspěvek do ekonlitového žurnálu podán do konce roku
2007
IES working paper č.1
2008
Publikace IES working paperu č.1 v ekonlitovém žurnálu
IES working paper č. 2
2009
Publikace IES working paperu č. 2 v ekonlitovém žurnálu

Konkretizace studijního plánu pro 1. rok studia

Výuka

Účast na doktorských seminářích

Začátek práce na disertaci

Předpokládané zkoušky

Další aktivity

Výuka

EM003/Advanced Microeconomics I/zimní

EM013/ Advanced Microeconomics II/letní

EM080/Public Choice Theory/letní

Účast na doktorských seminářích

ETPM/Economic Theory of Political Market/zimní

ETPM/Economic Theory of Political Market/letní

Začátek práce na disertaci

Práce na IES working paperu

Další aktivity

ZS, LS: Účast na obhajobách doktorských studentů (alespoň 50%)

Účast na konferencích

Plánované grantové aktivity:

Spolupráce na grantu GAČR 402/05/H510 Ekonomická teorie politických trhů

Vyjádření školitele

Doktorandka již začala s disertačním výzkumem, který vychází z úspěšně obhájené diplomové práce, její první plánovaný esej je již ve fázi dokončování a jeho výsledky byly veřejně prezentovány na mezinárodním workshopu v Helsinkách v říjnu tohoto roku. Výzkumné zaměření na modelování centralizace a decentralizace fiskálního rozhodování je perspektivní a navazuje na reprezentativní současnou literaturu v této oblasti. Doporučuji přijetí individuálního plánu.

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podpis školitele

.....
podpis studenta