|Status:||Bachelors - All
Bachelors - elective
BEF - elective
Semester - summer
|Course supervisors:|| doc. PhDr. Martin Gregor Ph.D.
|Literature:||Grossman, G.M., Helpman, E. (2001) Special Interest Politics. MIT Press.
McCarty, N., Meirowitz, A. (2007) Political Game Theory. Cambridge University Press.
Mueller, D. (2003) Public Choice III. Cambridge University Press.
Tadelis, S. (2013) Game Theory: An Introduction. Princeton University Press.
Weingast, B., Wittman, D. (2006) Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. Oxford University Press.
|Description:||This course introduces into non-cooperative game theory in the context of economic policy-making and collective decision-making in corporations and organizations. The course develops the game-theoretical toolkit through which economic policy-making, including budgeting, structural reforms, industry regulations, state aid, and decisions in budgeting and monetary committees can be rigorously analyzed.
The course targets three audiences:
1) Economists who want to model how firms, interest groups, individual politicians and political parties strategically shape economic policies.
2) Students of various fields who are interested in an introduction into game theory, and expect to use game-theoretical tools in various economic and political contexts.
3) Those familiar with basic tools from non-cooperative game theory who seek applications focused on collective decision-making, including decision-making in corporations.