JEM013 - Game Theory
| Credit: | 6 |
|---|---|
| Credit ETCS: | 6 |
| Hours weekly: | 2/2 |
| Status: | EEI and EP - elective English ET - mandatory F,FM and B - elective Masters - all MEF - elective Semester - summer |
| Obligatory courses: | |
| Recommended courses: | JEB007 - Microeconomics I JEB008 - Microeconomics II JEM003 - Advanced Microeconomics |
| Course supervisors: | prof. Ing. Karel Janda M.A., Dr., Ph. D., RWE Chair |
| Teachers: | prof. Ing. Karel Janda M.A., Dr., Ph. D., RWE Chair |
| Assistants: | Oksana Melikhova Ph.D. |
| Schedule: | Email: Karel-Janda@seznam.cz Office hours: Monday 9:30-10:50, 12:30-13:10 room 408, Opletalova 26;Tuesday 9:00-10:50 room 182NB, W. Churchilla Square 4. No office hours on March 4 (GACR), May 20 – September 23 (TSE). |
| Announcements: | |
| Literature: | R. Gibbons: Game Theory for Applied Economists, Princeton University Press, 1992 - main textbook. M. J. Osborne: An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press, 2004. A.Mas-Colell, M. Whinston, and J. Green: Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, 1995. Many examples, lecture notes, links to readings and newspaper articles can be found at www.gametheory.net. I will try to provide you with relevant handouts. There are libraries with books relevant to our class both at the University of Economics and Institute of Economic Studies. In addition, the best economic library in Prague is at CERGE-EI on Politickych veznu 7. The CERGE-EI library has all the books relevant for our class, some of them available for take-home loans. You may also buy the textbooks over the Internet or order them through some local bookshop like http://bohemia.starman.net/en/home.aspx |
| Description: | The introduction to game theory. |
| Content: | Topics Covered 1. Introduction to game theory. 2. Generic and finite perfect information games. 2.1. Backwards induction. 2.2. Strategies versus outcomes. 3. Bargaining. 4. Simultaneous move games. 4.1. Rationalizability. 4.2. Iterated weak dominance (IWD). 4.3. Mixed strategies. 4.4. Nash equilibrium. 5. Dynamic, imperfect information games. 5.1. Nash, IWD, rationalizability etc. 5.2. Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. 6. Repeated games. 6.1. Finitely repeated games. 6.2. Infinitely repeated games. 7. Incomplete information. 7.1. Static Bayesian games. 7.2. Signaling games. |
| Seminar: | |
| Examination dates: | The dates for exams: Exam 1: March 25, 8:00-9:20, room 109 Exam 2: April 15, 8:00-9:20, room 109 Exam 3: April 29, 8:00-9:20, room 109 Exam 4: May 13, 8:00-9:20, room 109 |
| Course requirements: | The students are evaluated according to written exams. There will be 4 exams available to take for this class. 2 exams with highest score will determine your score. Each of these two exams may give you up to 50 points. So totally you may obtain up to 100 points. I plan to use relative performance approach to the grading (that is, "grading on the curve"). This means in particular that the position of any student "on the curve" almost always is not sure up to the time of last test being taken. Cheating or other academic dishonesty during exam implies 0 for a particular exam and 10 points taken away from total in the case of slight dishonesty (20 points in the case of serious dishonesty). Any communication among the students during the exam is considered as cheating. Therefore during the exam communicate only with the exam supervisor. You may take watch and simple calculator for exams. Do not take any mobile phones or any other electronic devices for exams. |
| Downloadable: | Grades HW_solutions Seminar1_25Feb2013 Seminar2_04Mar2013 Seminar3_11Mar2013 Seminar4_18Mar2013 Seminar5_08Apr2013 Seminar6_22Apr2013 Seminar7_06May2013 |