GACR 402/09/1066: Political Economy of Voting Behavior: Rational Voter Theory and Models of Strategic Voting
|Principal investigator:||prof. RNDr. Ing. František Turnovec CSc.|
PhDr. Martin Gregor Ph.D.
Ing. Monika Hollmannová
PhDr. Lenka Šťastná Ph.D.
|Description:||The objective of the project is extension of analysis of voting behavior and models from the standpoint of possible strategic voting (sometimes associated with manipulation). By strategic voting we mean voters’ behavior promising maximization of expected individual or group utilities. By manipulation we mean such strategic behavior of one group that wants to influence some other voters to vote against their interests but for interests of manipulating group. As an innovation to existing approaches we want to introduce into the voting models categories of non-rational, semi-rational and rational voters and to study also information complexity of strategic voting. Game-theoretical and other operations research approaches (multi-criteria optimization) will be employed as a general framework of the models. There are two types of research output anticipated: theoretical models as contribution to rational voters’ theory, and empirical study of the new electoral history of the Czech Republic (1993-2010) and voting rules in European Union with an emphasis on elements of strategic voting.|
|Participation:||Research team will benefit from long term cooperation with other European academic institutions oriented on similar research topics: Institute of Socio-Economics of University of Hamburg (Prof. Manfred Holler), Institute of Industrial Organization of Wroclaw University of Technology (Prof. J.W. Mercik), University of Turku (Prof. Hannu Nurmi), and Department of Politic al Sciences of University of Leiden (Prof. Madeleine Hosli).|
|Work in grant:||THE FOLLOWING RESEARCH TOPICS ARE CONSIDERED:
1. Models of rational voter behavior and extensions
a) Axioms of rational voters’ behavior.
b) Voting systems (Condorcet, plurality, Borda, Dodgson, approval) and impossibility theorem
c) Efficiency of voting procedures
d) Models of rational voters’ behavior: game theoretical models and multi-criteria optimization
e) Strategic voting and/or manipulation, non-existence of non-dictatorial and non-manipulative
f) Types of manipulation (classification)
g) Manipulability of different voting procedures
h) Information complexity of manipulation
2. Models with non-rational, semi-rational and rational voters
a) Concepts of voter’s rationality
b) Rational voter = second best outcomes?
c) Semi-rational voter = sincere rational voter?
d) Manipulative rationality
e) Non-rational voter = random voting?
3. Models of voting in small groups and decentralized committee systems
a) Strategic voting in small groups
b) Expert panels and selection committees: evaluation of projects (alternatives)
c) University decision making
d) Public finance, strategic voting and financing of public good
e) Voting in the EU decision making procedures
f) Distribution of voting power and strategic voting in committees.
4. Empirical study
a) New electoral history of the Czech Republic (1992-2010)
b) Voting rules in the EU decision making
RESEARCH SEMINARS 2009
Seminar 1/09 - February 16
František Turnovec: Efficiency of Fairness in Voting Systems
Seminar 2/09 - March 2
Martin Gregor: The Optimal State Aid Control: No Control
Seminar 3/09 – April 27
Political Economy of Voting Behavior, Rational Voter Theory and Models of Strategic Voting, basic concepts and methodology
Seminar 4/09 - May 4
Pavel Doležel: On the Efficiency of Voting in the IC, IAC and GIAC models
Seminar 5/09 - June 1
František Turnovec: How much of federation in the EU
Seminar 6/09 - December 14
Pavel Doležel: Analysis of the 2009 European Parliament elections in the Czech Republic
|Web link:||GACR 402/09/1066|
|Finance:||2009: 577 th. CZK
2010: 631 th. CZK
2011: 692 th. CZK
Research seminar 1/09
Research seminar 2/09
Research seminar 3/09
Research seminar 4/09
Research seminar 5/09
Research seminar 6/09