Grant detail

GACR 402/09/1066: Political Economy of Voting Behavior: Rational Voter Theory and Models of Strategic Voting

Principal investigator: prof. RNDr. Ing. František Turnovec CSc.
Collaborators: Pavel Doležel
PhDr. Martin Gregor Ph.D.
Ing. Monika Hollmannová
PhDr. Lenka Šťastná Ph.D.
Description: The objective of the project is extension of analysis of voting behavior and models from the standpoint of possible strategic voting (sometimes associated with manipulation). By strategic voting we mean voters’ behavior promising maximization of expected individual or group utilities. By manipulation we mean such strategic behavior of one group that wants to influence some other voters to vote against their interests but for interests of manipulating group. As an innovation to existing approaches we want to introduce into the voting models categories of non-rational, semi-rational and rational voters and to study also information complexity of strategic voting. Game-theoretical and other operations research approaches (multi-criteria optimization) will be employed as a general framework of the models. There are two types of research output anticipated: theoretical models as contribution to rational voters’ theory, and empirical study of the new electoral history of the Czech Republic (1993-2010) and voting rules in European Union with an emphasis on elements of strategic voting.
Participation: Research team will benefit from long term cooperation with other European academic institutions oriented on similar research topics: Institute of Socio-Economics of University of Hamburg (Prof. Manfred Holler), Institute of Industrial Organization of Wroclaw University of Technology (Prof. J.W. Mercik), University of Turku (Prof. Hannu Nurmi), and Department of Politic al Sciences of University of Leiden (Prof. Madeleine Hosli).
Work in grant: THE FOLLOWING RESEARCH TOPICS ARE CONSIDERED:

1. Models of rational voter behavior and extensions
a) Axioms of rational voters’ behavior.
b) Voting systems (Condorcet, plurality, Borda, Dodgson, approval) and impossibility theorem
c) Efficiency of voting procedures
d) Models of rational voters’ behavior: game theoretical models and multi-criteria optimization
models, properties
e) Strategic voting and/or manipulation, non-existence of non-dictatorial and non-manipulative
voting procedures
f) Types of manipulation (classification)
g) Manipulability of different voting procedures
h) Information complexity of manipulation
2. Models with non-rational, semi-rational and rational voters
a) Concepts of voter’s rationality
b) Rational voter = second best outcomes?
c) Semi-rational voter = sincere rational voter?
d) Manipulative rationality
e) Non-rational voter = random voting?
3. Models of voting in small groups and decentralized committee systems
a) Strategic voting in small groups
b) Expert panels and selection committees: evaluation of projects (alternatives)
c) University decision making
d) Public finance, strategic voting and financing of public good
e) Voting in the EU decision making procedures
f) Distribution of voting power and strategic voting in committees.
4. Empirical study
a) New electoral history of the Czech Republic (1992-2010)
b) Voting rules in the EU decision making

RESEARCH SEMINARS 2009

Seminar 1/09 - February 16
František Turnovec: Efficiency of Fairness in Voting Systems
Seminar 2/09 - March 2
Martin Gregor: The Optimal State Aid Control: No Control
Seminar 3/09 – April 27
František Turnovec:
Political Economy of Voting Behavior, Rational Voter Theory and Models of Strategic Voting, basic concepts and methodology
Seminar 4/09 - May 4
Pavel Doležel: On the Efficiency of Voting in the IC, IAC and GIAC models
Seminar 5/09 - June 1
František Turnovec: How much of federation in the EU
Seminar 6/09 - December 14
Pavel Doležel: Analysis of the 2009 European Parliament elections in the Czech Republic
Web link: GACR 402/09/1066
Finance: 2009: 577 th. CZK
2010: 631 th. CZK
2011: 692 th. CZK
End date: 2011
Publications:

Apportionment in Proportional Electoral Systems Based on Integer Programming

Book review - Pradeep Chhibber & Ken Kollman: The Formation of National Party Systems

Civic Initiatives in the Context of Legal Uncertainty

Contest for power in organizations

Corporate lobbying: A review of the recent literature

Fair Majorities in Proportional Voting

Fair Voting Majorities in Proportional Representation

Fair Voting Rules in Committees

Mathematics of Politics, Economics Methodology in Political Science

Modelování místních referend iniciovaných občany ve střední a východní Evropě in M. Smith (2009) "Občané v politice: Studie k participativní a přímé demokracii ve střední Evropě

Odhadování efektivity velkých volebních systémů

Politika a ekonomie: Úvod do ekonomických analýz politiky

Strict proportional power and fair voiting rules in committee

The decentralization tradeoff for complementary spillovers

The Optimal State Aid Control: No Control

The Optimal State Aid Control: No Control

Transition of Votes for Consecutive Elections – Ecological Regression Modelling

Turnovec F. (2009), Council, Commission and European Parliament in European Union Decision Making.

Turnovec F. (2009), Efficiency of Fairness in Voting Systems

Turnovec F. (2009), Fairness and Squareness: Fair Decision Making Rules in the EU Council?

Turnovec F. (2009), Fairness and Squareness: Fair Decision Making Rules in the EU Council?

Turnovec F. (2009), How much of Federalism in the European Union

Turnovec F. (2009), How much of Federalism in the European Union?

Turnovec F. (2011), Fair Voting Rules in Committees, Strict Proportional Power and Optimal Quota.

Two-dimensional Voting Bodies, the Case of European Parliament.

Volební systémy pro volby do Poslanecké sněmovny Parlamentu ČR založené na matematickém programování

Conferences:

6. bienální konference České společnosti ekonomické

Amsterdam, 1.-3.7.2009, SING5 - 5th Spain Italy Netherlands Meeting on Game Theory

Athens, 2.-5.4.2009, European Public Choice Society 2009 Conference

IIPF 2009: International Institute for Public Finance, Cape Town, RSA

Ottawa 24.-26.6.2009, International Conference on Policy Modeling - ECOMOD2009

Voting, Power and Manipulation

Voting, Power and Manipulation, joint workshop with Public Choice Research Center

Výroční konference ČSE, 27. 11. 2010

Warsaw International Economic Meeting 2009

Downloadable: Project 2008
Research seminar 1/09
Research seminar 2/09
Research seminar 3/09
Research seminar 4/09
Research seminar 5/09
Research seminar 6/09