Detail publikace

A Fiscal Rule That Has Teeth:A Suggestion for a Fiscal Sustainability Council Underpinned by the Financial Markets

Autor: PhDr. Petr Hedbávný ,
doc. Ing. Ondřej Schneider MPhil., Ph.D.,
PhDr. Jan Zápal Ph.D.,
Typ: IES Working Papers
Rok: 2005
Číslo: 79
ISSN / ISBN:
Publikováno v: IES WP 2005/79
Místo vydání: Prague
Klíčová slova: fiscal policy, European Union, sustainability
JEL kódy: E6, H6, H87
Citace:
Abstrakt: In this paper, we set out to examine an efficient fiscal-policy framework for a monetary union. We illustrate that fiscal policy’s bias toward budget deficit only temporarily ceased at the end of the 20th century as European countries endeavored to qualify for euro-zone membership, which compelled strict limits on budgetary deficits. We then explore which mechanisms might instill a sense of fiscal disciple in governments. We find that most mechanisms suffer from the incentive-incompatible setup whereby governments restrict their own fiscal-policy freedom. We argue that even multilateral fiscal rules, such as the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact, suffer from the same endogeneity flaw. Consequently, we argue that a fiscal rule must incorporate an external authority that would impartially assess fiscal-policy developments. Using U.S. debt and bond-market data at the state level, we show that financial markets represent a good candidate as, vis-à-vis the American states, they do differentiate state debt according to the level of debt. We thus argue for a fiscal institution––what we call the Fiscal Sustainability Council––that would actively bring financial markets into the fiscal-policy process, and we explain the technique whereby this could be effected.
Ke stažení: WP 2005_79_Schneider, Hedbavny, Zapal

Partneři

ČSOB
Deloitte
McKinsey & Company

Sponzoři

CRIF