Detail publikace

Optimal Deterministic Debt Contracts

Autor: prof. Ing. Karel Janda M.A., Dr., Ph.D.,
Typ: IES Working Papers
Rok: 2006
Číslo: 25
ISSN / ISBN:
Publikováno v: IES WP 2006/25
Místo vydání: Prague
Klíčová slova: Costly State Verification, Multiple Lenders, Debt
JEL kódy: C72, D82, G33
Citace: Janda, K., (2006). “ Optimal Deterministic Debt Contracts ” IES Working Paper 25/2006, IES FSV. Charles University
Granty: Výzkumný záměr IES (2005-2011) Integrace české ekonomiky do Evropské unie a její rozvoj
Abstrakt: This paper extends the costly enforcement model of optimal financing to the case of investment projects financed by several lenders. We consider the asymmetric situation when only one lender is a big strategic investor. All other lender are small passive investors. We first provide the sufficient and necessary condition for renegotiation proofness. Then we show that the optimal verification is deterministic. We also discuss the conditions under which the optimal contract is a debt contract.
Ke stažení: WP 2006_25_Janda

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