To Microeconomic Climate in the Czech Republic in Beginning of Century: Cartel of fuel sellers? (Case study)
|Author(s):|| prof. RNDr. Jiří Hlaváček CSc., |
PhDr. Michal Hlaváček Ph.D.,
|Type:||IES Working Papers|
|ISSN / ISBN:|
|Published in:||IES WP 2003/39|
|Abstract:||Case study views charge by the antimonopoly authority against Czech dominant sellers of fuel in the late 1990s. Possibilities to prove cartel by comparison of individual prices or by reviewing of dynamics of individual receipts and profits are discussed. The fact, that one cannot distinguish between the illegal cartel and the legal price following (Stackelberg´s oligopoly), which is more advantageous then price competition (Bertrand´s oligopoly) is the most problematical. The price following can be a result of profit maximization by competitors without cartel arrangement. The cartel is not excluded, but it is very difficult to be proved.
Key words : Case study, antimonopoly policy, cartel, Stackelberg´s oligopoly, price following