Privatization without Capital
|Author(s):|| † prof. Ing. Karel Kouba DrSc., Jitka Roberts|
PhDr. Ondřej Vychodil , M.A., Jitka Roberts
|Type:||IES Working Papers|
|ISSN / ISBN:|
|Published in:||IES WP 2004/46|
|Keywords:||Economic transition, economic policy, liberalization, privatization, restructuring, institution, moral hazard|
|Abstract:||The publication Privatization without Capital consists of three studies linked by an institutional view on selected issues of the Czech economic transformation.
In the first paper, Karel Kouba presents the theoretical background of liberalization-stabilization and privatization policies in transition countries. The evolution of thoughts within the mainstream neo-classical economics is confronted with the new institutional analysis and the problems of the Czech way of privatization are seen in the fragile microeconomic and inadequate institutional fundaments of the transformation.
In the second paper, Ondřej Vychodil examines the impact of post-privatization ownership structure on the firms restructuring. Inspired by the analysis of negative and positive effects of ownership concentration in developed market economies, the author derives a hypothesis for the Czech environment and verifies it using both already existing empirical literature and own econometric analysis of firm-level data.
In the third paper, Jitka Roberts presents an original description of empirically observed behavioral patterns of new owners to privatized Czech enterprises in the moral hazard situation. While in privatization games owners transfer lucrative assets from privatized units to their own firms, in credit games owners and lending banks try to solve the growing problem of repaying transformation loans.