Detail publikace

Committed to Deficit: The Reverse Side of Fiscal Governance

Autor: doc. PhDr. Martin Gregor Ph.D.,
Typ: IES Working Papers
Rok: 2005
Číslo: 88
ISSN / ISBN:
Publikováno v: IES WP 2005/88
Místo vydání: Prague
Klíčová slova: Fiscal Governance, Party Fragmentation
JEL kódy: D78, H61, H62
Citace:
Granty: GACR 402/05/H510 Ekonomická teorie politických trhů Výzkumný záměr IES (2005-2011) Integrace české ekonomiky do Evropské unie a její rozvoj
Abstrakt: Common wisdom dictates that fiscal governance (i.e. procedural fiscal rules) improves fiscal discipline. We rather find that selected fiscal constraints protect the coalitional status quo from logrolling. In effect, fiscal governance may deteriorate fiscal position.
In political economy with heterogeneous agents, we examine four procedural fiscal rules: limits on amendments in legislative committees, timing of a vote on the budget size, deficit targets, and spending level targets. We find that fiscal governance protects the budgetary contract of governing coalition from attractive compromises with the opposition. When parties are evenly distributed across single policy dimension, and minimum winning connected coalitions are equiprobable, this protection is shown to magnify volatility in taxes and spending. Moreover, the volatility may increase in more fragmented party systems. We conclude fiscal governance not always and not necessarily reduces fiscal costs of fragmentation.
Ke stažení: WP 88_Gregor
VO Martina Jasova

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