Detail publikace

Political Economy of Public Deficit: Perspectives for Constitutional Reform

Autor: doc. PhDr. Adam Geršl Ph.D.,
Typ: IES Working Papers
Rok: 2005
Číslo: 98
ISSN / ISBN:
Publikováno v: IES WP 2005/98
Místo vydání: Prague
Klíčová slova: fiscal policy; dynamic inconsistency; political economy; public deficit
JEL kódy: E61, E63, P16
Citace:
Abstrakt: The paper uses a dynamic inconsistency model known from monetary policy to assess three alternative proposals how to reform fiscal constitution in order to limit government’s incentive to use fiscal policy for maximizing political support. The return to ever-balanced-budget rule, state-contingent rules, and the establishment of an independent Fiscal Policy Committee with power to set public deficit with the aim of stabilizing the economy are discussed from the constitutional perspective, analyzing different incentives that these proposals create for government and alternative means to enhance credibility of the arrangement.
Ke stažení: WP 98_Gersl
Prosinec 2017
poútstčtsone
    123
45678910
11121314151617
18192021222324
25262728293031

Partneři

ČSOB
Deloitte
McKinsey & Company

Sponzoři

CRIF