Detail publikace

Which Government Interventions Are Good in Alleviating Credit Market Failures?

Autor: prof. Ing. Karel Janda M.A., Dr., Ph.D.,
Typ: IES Working Papers
Rok: 2008
Číslo: 12
ISSN / ISBN:
Publikováno v: IES Working Papers 12/2008
Místo vydání: Prague
Klíčová slova: information asymmetry, credit, guarantees, subsidies
JEL kódy: D82, G18, H25
Citace: Janda, K. (2008). “ Which Government Interventions Are Good in Alleviating Credit Market Failures? ” IES Working Paper 12/2008. IES FSV. Charles University.
Granty: Výzkumný záměr IES (2005-2011) Integrace české ekonomiky do Evropské unie a její rozvoj
Abstrakt: Credit contracting between a lender with a market power and a small start-up entrepreneur may lead to a rejection of projects whose expected benefits are higher than their total costs when an adverse selection is present. This inefficiency may be eliminated by a government support in the form of credit guarantees or subsidies. The principal-agent model of this paper compares different forms of government support and concludes that a guarantee defined as a proportion of a gross interest rate is not a sufficiently robust policy instrument. Lump-sum guarantees and interest rate subsidies are evaluated as better instruments because they have a nonambiguous positive effect on a social efficiency since they enable funding of socially efficient projects which would not be financed otherwise.
Ke stažení: WP 2008_12_Janda
Prosinec 2017
poútstčtsone
    123
45678910
11121314151617
18192021222324
25262728293031

Partneři

ČSOB
Deloitte
McKinsey & Company

Sponzoři

CRIF