The Supply of Foreign Direct Investment Incentives: Subsidy Competition in an Oligopolistic Framework
| Autor: | prof. PhDr. Tomáš Havránek Ph.D., |
|---|---|
| Typ: | Články v impaktovaných časopisech |
| Rok: | 2009 |
| Číslo: | 2 |
| ISSN / ISBN: | |
| Publikováno v: | Prague Economic Papers, 2009(2), 131--155 |
| Místo vydání: | |
| Klíčová slova: | Investment incentives, Subsidy competition, Productivity spillovers, Oligopoly, Foreign direct investment, Multinational corporations |
| JEL kódy: | F12, F21, F23, H25, H71, H87 |
| Citace: | |
| Abstrakt: | This paper examines the microeconomic motivation of governments to provide tax incentives for foreign direct investment. Author applies the classical models of oligopoly to subsidy competition, endogenousing investment incentives, but leaving tax rates exogenous. According to the conventional wisdom, subsidy competition leads to overprovision of incentives. This paper suggests that, in the oligopolistic framework, supranational coordination can either decrease or increase the supply of subsidies. Further, in the setting of subsidy regulation, the host country's corporate income tax rate has an ambiguous eect on the provision of incentives. |
