Publication detail

Towards Measurement of Political Pressure on Central Banks: The case of the Central Bank of Egypt

Author(s): Ibrahim Awad ,
Type: Articles in journals with impact factor
Year: 2008
Number: 3
ISSN / ISBN: 1210-0455
Published in: Prague Economic Papers
Publishing place: University of Economics, Prague
Keywords: central bank independence; fiscal dominance; political pressure
JEL codes: E51, E59, H75, C23
Suggested Citation:
Abstract: This paper assesses whether the legal independence granted to the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) by
the latest legislation promulgated in 2005 is factual. The author followed Fry’s methodology, which
assumes that the level of independence of the central bank is determined by fiscal attributes. In an
attempt to develop Fry’s method, there was used a simple criterion to assess the central bank’s
independence, namely, that the central bank is actually independent if it can fulfill its money supply
target without squeezing the private sector. Applying this criterion to the case of the CBE, we find
that: the legal independence granted to the CBE by the latest legislation is not factual.

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