Detail publikace

Economic Volatility and Institutional Reforms in Macroeconomic Policymaking: The Case of Fiscal Policy

Autor: doc. PhDr. Adam Geršl Ph.D.,
PhDr. Jan Zápal Ph.D.,
Typ: IES Working Papers
Rok: 2010
Číslo: 15
ISSN / ISBN:
Publikováno v: IES Working Papers 15/2010
Místo vydání: Prague
Klíčová slova: dynamic inconsistency, fiscal and monetary policy interaction, independent fiscal council
JEL kódy: E42, E58, E63, H30
Citace: Geršl, A., Zápal, J. (2010). “Economic Volatility and Institutional Reforms in Macroeconomic Policymaking: The Case of Fiscal Policy” IES Working Paper 15/2010. IES FSV. Charles University.
Granty: GACR 402/08/0501 (2008-2010) Politická ekonomie veřejných rozpočtů
Abstrakt: We evaluate proposals for independent fiscal authority put forward as a solution to excessive public spending. Our main conclusion is that moving the responsibility to set broad measures of fiscal policy from the hands of government to an independent fiscal council is not necessarily welfare improving. We show that the change is welfare improving if nature of uncertainty between fiscal and monetary policymakers does not change as a result. However, if this institutional change involves considerable decrease of capacity of the new agency to recognize economic shocks, citizens' welfare can decrease as a results. This is especially significant in times of increased economic volatility such as in a recent global financial crisis. Faced with the ambiguous theoretical result, we try to gain deeper insight by calibrating our simple model.
Ke stažení: WP 2010_15_Gersl, Zapal

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