Detail publikace

Credit Guarantees and Subsidies when Lender has a Market Power

Autor: prof. Ing. Karel Janda M.A., Dr., Ph.D.,
Typ: IES Working Papers
Rok: 2011
Číslo: 18
ISSN / ISBN:
Publikováno v: IES Working Papers 18/2011
Místo vydání: Prague
Klíčová slova: credit; subsidies; guarantees
JEL kódy: D82, G18, H25.
Citace: Janda, K. (2011). “Credit Guarantees and Subsidies when Lender has a Market Power” IES Working Paper 18/2011. IES FSV. Charles University.
Granty: GAČR 403/10/1235 (2010-2014) Institucionální reakce na selhání finančních trhů
Abstrakt: Provision of credit guarantees or subsidies may remove an adverse selection leading to credit rationing. This paper concentrates on comparison of government budget costs of credit guarantees and subsidies in a monopolistic credit market. Different opportunity costs among entrepreneurs, which reflect different mixes of general and
human specific capital, generate different outcomes in the model. As long as the participation costs of low-risk entrepreneurs are sufficiently close to the participation costs of high-risk entrepreneurs, the budget-cost minimizing government should prefer guarantees over interest rate subsidies as an intervention instrument.
Ke stažení: WP 2011_18_Janda.pdf
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