Corporate lobbying: A review of the recent literature
|| PhDr. Martin Gregor Ph.D., |
||IES Working Papers
|ISSN / ISBN:
||IES Working Papers 32/2011
||lobbying, political contributions, menu auction, contest, persuasion
||D72, D82, D83
||Gregor, M. (2011). “Corporate lobbying: A review of the recent literature” IES Working Paper 32/2011. IES FSV. Charles University.
||GACR 402/09/1066: Political Economy of Voting Behavior: Rational Voter Theory and Models of Strategic Voting
||This survey covers recent literature on lobbying, with particular focus on corporate lobbying. Three main research traditions --- contestsfor policy rent, persuasion games, and multiple means models --- are analyzed in detail. Various strategic aspects of lobbying arepresented in the context of a single unified model that encompasses both strategic communication and monetary contributions. Next, thereview investigates into three particular issues in the lobbying literature: (i) Incentive to lobby and the equilibrium amount of lobbying,both in the presence and absence of competitors, (ii) strategic substitution and complementarity of lobbying and contributions,and (iii) the role of intermediation in lobbying. Recent evidence from corporate lobbying is presented.