Publication detail

Two-dimensional Voting Bodies, the Case of European Parliament.

Author(s): † prof. RNDr. Ing. František Turnovec CSc.,
Type: Article in collection
Year: 2012
Number: 0
ISSN / ISBN: ISBN 978-80-7248-779-0
Published in: RAMÍK, J. and STAVÁREK, D. (eds.), Proceedings of 30th International Conference Mathematical Methods in Economics. (Listed in the Thomson Reuters ISI Index to Social Sciences & Humanities Proceedings (ISSHP))
Publishing place: Karviná: Silesian University, School of Business Administration
Keywords: European Parliament, European political parties, ideological coordination, national coordination, Shapley-Shubik power index, two-dimensional voting bodies, voting power of national party groups
JEL codes: D71, C71
Suggested Citation: Turnovec F. (2012), Two-dimensional Voting Bodies, the Case of European Parliament. In: RAMÍK, J. and STAVÁREK, D. (eds.), Proceedings of 30th International Conference Mathematical Methods in Economics, pp. 932-937.
Grants: GACR 402/09/1066: Political Economy of Voting Behavior: Rational Voter Theory and Models of Strategic Voting
Abstract: By a two-dimensional voting body we mean the following: the body is elected in several regional voting districts by proportional system based on multi-party competition of national political parties. Then the members of the body exercise dual responsibility: responsibility following from the party membership and responsibility
following from regional affiliation.
In this paper we formulate the following problem: Taking as decisional units
national chapters of European political parties, is there a difference between a priori voting power of national groups in the case of “national” coordination of voting and
in the case of “partisan” coordination of voting? By coordination of voting we mean
two step process: in the first step there is an internal voting in the groups of units
(national or partisan), in the second step there is a voting coordination of aggregated
groups (European political parties or national representations). In the both cases the voting has an ideological dimension (elementary unit is a national party group), difference is only in dimension of aggregation. Power indices methodology is used to evaluate voting power of national party groups, European political parties and national representations in the cases of partisan and national coordination of voting
behaviour.
Downloadable: reprint

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