Publication detail

Fair Voting Rules in Committees

Author(s): † prof. RNDr. Ing. František Turnovec CSc.,
Type: Chapter in book
Year: 2013
Number: 0
ISSN / ISBN: 978-3-642-35928-6
Published in: Springer Verlag
Publishing place: Berlin-Heidelberg
Keywords: Simple weighted committee, fairness, optimal quota, strict proportional power, voting and power indices
JEL codes: C71, D72, H77
Suggested Citation: Turnovec F., Fair Voting Rules in Committees. In: Holler M.J. and H. Nurmi (eds), Power, Voting and Voting Power, Springer Verlag, Berlin-Heidelberg, pp. 347-364
Grants: GACR 402/09/1066: Political Economy of Voting Behavior: Rational Voter Theory and Models of Strategic Voting
Abstract: In simple weighted committees with a finite number of members, fixed weights, and changing quota there exist a finite number of different quota intervals of stable power with the same sets of winning coalitions for all quotas from each of them. If in a committee the sets of winning coalitions
for different quotas are the same, then the power indices based on pivots, swings, or minimal winning coalitions are also the same for those quotas. If the fair distribution of voting weights is defined, then the fair distribution of voting power means to find a quota that minimizes
the distance between relative voting weights and relative voting power (optimal quota).
The problem of the optimal quota has an exact solution via the finite number of quotas from different intervals of stable power.
Downloadable: reprint

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