Detail publikace

Two Kinds of Voting Procedures Manipulability: Strategic Voting and Strategic Nomination

Autor: prof. RNDr. Ing. František Turnovec CSc.,
Typ: IES Working Papers
Rok: 2015
Číslo: 11
ISSN / ISBN:
Publikováno v: IES Working Papers 11/2015
Místo vydání: Prague
Klíčová slova: Arrow’s theorem, dictatorship, Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, manipulation, Pareto efficiency, strategic voting, strategic nomination
JEL kódy: D71
Citace: Turnovec F. (2015). “ Two Kinds of Voting Procedures Manipulability: Strategic Voting and Strategic Nomination” IES Working Paper 11/2015. IES FSV. Charles University.
Granty: GACR 402/09/1066: Political Economy of Voting Behavior: Rational Voter Theory and Models of Strategic Voting
Abstrakt: In this paper the concepts of manipulation as strategic voting (misrepresentation of true preferences) and strategic nomination (by adding, or removing alternatives) are investigated. The connection between Arrow’s and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems is discussed from the viewpoint of dilemma between dictatorship and manipulability.
Ke stažení: wp_2015_11_turnovec

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