Publication detail

Two Kinds of Voting Procedures Manipulability: Strategic Voting and Strategic Nomination

Author(s): † prof. RNDr. Ing. František Turnovec CSc.,
Type: IES Working Papers
Year: 2015
Number: 11
ISSN / ISBN:
Published in: IES Working Papers 11/2015
Publishing place: Prague
Keywords: Arrow’s theorem, dictatorship, Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, manipulation, Pareto efficiency, strategic voting, strategic nomination
JEL codes: D71
Suggested Citation: Turnovec F. (2015). “ Two Kinds of Voting Procedures Manipulability: Strategic Voting and Strategic Nomination” IES Working Paper 11/2015. IES FSV. Charles University.
Grants: GACR 402/09/1066: Political Economy of Voting Behavior: Rational Voter Theory and Models of Strategic Voting
Abstract: In this paper the concepts of manipulation as strategic voting (misrepresentation of true preferences) and strategic nomination (by adding, or removing alternatives) are investigated. The connection between Arrow’s and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems is discussed from the viewpoint of dilemma between dictatorship and manipulability.
Downloadable: wp_2015_11_turnovec

22

January

January 2021
MonTueWedThuFriSatSun
    123
45678910
11121314151617
1819202122

2324
25262728293031

Partners

Deloitte

Sponsors

CRIF
McKinsey
Patria Finance