Detail publikace

Collusion in Multi-object Auctions: Experimental Evidence

Autor: PhDr. Lubomír Cingl Ph.D.,
Mgr. Jindřich Matoušek ,
Typ: IES Working Papers
Rok: 2015
Číslo: 20
ISSN / ISBN:
Publikováno v: IES Working Papers 20/2015
Místo vydání: Prague
Klíčová slova: Combinatorial Auction, Communication, Collusion, Experiment
JEL kódy: C91, D43, D44, D83
Citace: Matousek J., Cingl L. (2015). “ Collusion in Multiobject Auctions: An Experimental Evidence” IES Working Paper 20/2015. IES FSV. Charles University.
Granty: GDN 2014 - An Experimental Test of Design Alternatives for Spectrum Auctions with Communication Channels
Abstrakt: multi-unit auction mechanisms in the presence of an opportunity to collude among bidding participants due to a provision of a simple communication channel. The results suggest that the combinatorial bidding format does not bring higher efficiency. Allowing for communication increases efficiency in both examined auction formats. Bidders are able to split the auctioned goods in a cheap-talk collusive agreement, which results in a better allocation compared to the auction formats without the communication channel. Combinatorial bidding on packages makes the decision-making problem of bidders hard to process and cause inefficiencies, especially for designs with the large number of auctioned goods.
Ke stažení: wp_2015_20_matousek_cingl
Leden 2022
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