Detail publikace

Collusion in Multi-object Auctions: Experimental Evidence

Autor: PhDr. Lubomír Cingl Ph.D.,
Mgr. Jindřich Matoušek ,
Typ: Články v impaktovaných časopisech
Rok: 2018
Číslo: 56
ISSN / ISBN:
Publikováno v: Eastern European Economics
Místo vydání:
Klíčová slova: Combinatorial Auction; Communication; Collusion; Experiment
JEL kódy:
Citace: Jindřich Matoušek & Lubomír Cingl, 2018. "Collusion in Multi-Object Auctions: Experimental Evidence," Eastern European Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 56(1), pages 28-56, January.
Granty: GDN 2014 - An Experimental Test of Design Alternatives for Spectrum Auctions with Communication Channels Komunikace ve vícerozměrných aukcích: Experimentální studie koluzivnho chování
Abstrakt: This article experimentally examines two complex multi-unit auction mechanisms—a simultaneous multi-round auction and its extension with combinatorial bidding—that offer the opportunity to communicate and thus collude. The general setting and parametrization originated in the 2013 Czech Spectrum Auction. The results suggest that the package bidding format does not bring higher efficiency. Strikingly, allowing for communication increases efficiency in the examined auction formats. A cheap-talk collusive agreement resulted in better allocation, as compared to the treatments without communication. The authors hypothesize that combinatorial bidding makes the decision-making of bidders too complicated and causes inefficiency, especially in auctions with large numbers of goods.

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