Publication detail

Collusion in Multi-object Auctions: Experimental Evidence

Author(s): PhDr. Lubomír Cingl Ph.D.,
Mgr. Jindřich Matoušek ,
Type: Articles in journals with impact factor
Year: 2018
Number: 56
ISSN / ISBN:
Published in: Eastern European Economics
Publishing place:
Keywords: Combinatorial Auction; Communication; Collusion; Experiment
JEL codes:
Suggested Citation: Jindřich Matoušek & Lubomír Cingl, 2018. "Collusion in Multi-Object Auctions: Experimental Evidence," Eastern European Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 56(1), pages 28-56, January.
Grants: Communication in Multiobject Auctions: Experimental Studies of Collusion Behaviour GDN 2014 - An Experimental Test of Design Alternatives for Spectrum Auctions with Communication Channels
Abstract: This article experimentally examines two complex multi-unit auction mechanisms—a simultaneous multi-round auction and its extension with combinatorial bidding—that offer the opportunity to communicate and thus collude. The general setting and parametrization originated in the 2013 Czech Spectrum Auction. The results suggest that the package bidding format does not bring higher efficiency. Strikingly, allowing for communication increases efficiency in the examined auction formats. A cheap-talk collusive agreement resulted in better allocation, as compared to the treatments without communication. The authors hypothesize that combinatorial bidding makes the decision-making of bidders too complicated and causes inefficiency, especially in auctions with large numbers of goods.

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