Detail práce

Experimentální ověřování předpovědí teorie her: Ultimatum game

Autor: Bc. Ludmila Matysková
Rok: 2011 - letní
Vedoucí: doc. PhDr. Martin Gregor Ph.D.
Konzultant:
Typ práce: Bakalářská
Jazyk: Anglicky
Stránky: 101
Ocenění: Pochvala děkana Fakulty sociálních věd za vynikající výkon u státních zkoušek a za vynikající bakalářskou práci
Odkaz:
Abstrakt: This thesis focuses on testing of game theoretical predictions in the ultimatum
game by means of controlled experiments. This game has become one of the
most scrutinized games from the area of bargaining game theory. The theoretical
division of the reward, which the players bargain over, is such that one player
gets virtually all the reward while the second player is left with nothing. Because
of such an extreme division of the reward, the game represents a severe test for
the theory. In fact, experimental results do not confirm to the theory. This thesis
provides a survey of the experimental studies investigating different aspects that
may affect the subjects’ behavior in the game. Furthermore, some possible
explanations for why the theoretical solution is not observed to be played by
the subjects in the laboratory are presented. I show several new models, which
try to capture the real nature of the subjects’ behavior in the game. I also
focus on the proposers’ behavior from the income-maximizing point of view if
the distribution of the responder’s minimum acceptance thresholds is known to
them. Outline of a new experiment examining such behavior is then presented.
Ke stažení: Bakalářská práce Matysková

Partneři

ČSOB
Deloitte
McKinsey & Company

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CRIF