|Author:||Mgr. Tomáš Fiala|
|Year:||2012 - summer|
|Leaders:|| doc. PhDr. Martin Gregor Ph.D.
|Work type:|| Economic Theory
|Awards and prizes:||M.A. with distinction from the Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences for an excellent state-final examination performance.|
|Abstract:||In this thesis we review literature about the coordination problem under an
uncertainty. We set up a continuum player model of collective action, in which
part of the population must coordinate on an action in order to achieve a mutual
benet. The complete information version of the model features multiple
equilibria. We study the role of various sources of uncertainty in the model and
compare them. We also examine the role of private and public information.
We discuss particularly the global game, the coordination game of incomplete
information in which agents received dierent but correlated signals about
the state. We demonstrate that in the global game an unique equilibrium can
be found by iterated elimination of dominated strategies. We compare the
global game to related models and examine the consequences of relaxing the
assumptions of global game.
In addition we show some practical implication of the model for revolutions
and currency crises.
|Downloadable:|| DT Fiala