Voting in central banks: An empirical analysis
|Author:||Bc. Júlia Jonášová|
|Year:||2014 - summer|
|Leaders:|| prof. Roman Horváth Ph.D.
|Work type:|| Bachelors
|Awards and prizes:||B.A. with distinction from the Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences for an extraordinarily good bachelors diploma thesis.|
|Abstract:||The aim of the thesis is to assess informative power of the voting records of central banks.
The research concentrates on the following aspects: predictability of future repo rate changes
based on the voting records in longer horizons, level of disagreement in Monetary policy
committee (MPC) and financial markets’ expectations, comparison between results of the
analysis before and during the financial crisis and weighting every vote according to
attendance of the policymaker. The results confirm that voting records are, indeed,
informative about future monetary policy changes and can increase predictability of the
particular central banks. Negative dispersion coefficient for the Bank of England (BoE) and
Czech National Bank (CNB) suggests that increase in uncertainty stimulates looser monetary
policy. For the BoE and Riksbank voting records signal the change of the repo rate approved
also at the further meetings, which is partially true for the Czech Republic and Poland.
Regarding the period of financial crisis, it is shown that markets heavily rely on the minutes
as the source of knowledge and the magnitudes of the estimate for the skew coefficient are
much higher. The effect of experience is present in the case of CNB and National Bank of