Detail práce

Numerical Modelling of Two-Prize Asymmetric Contests

Autor: Mgr. Ludmila Matysková
Rok: 2013 - letní
Vedoucí: doc. PhDr. Martin Gregor Ph.D.
Konzultant:
Typ práce: Diplomová
Ekonomická teorie
Jazyk: Anglicky
Stránky: 99
Ocenění: Pochvala děkana Fakulty sociálních věd za vynikající výkon u státních zkoušek a za vynikající diplomovou práci.
Odkaz: https://is.cuni.cz/webapps/zzp/detail/93025/
Abstrakt: This thesis presents an analysis on a class of asymmetric imperfectly discriminating
multi-prize contests with the aim to investigate when more than one
prize becomes optimal prize allocation if the average effort is to be maximized.
We present n-person model with heterogeneous contestants who compete for
two, possibly different, prizes. The contestants may differ in their relative abilities,
i.e., parameters affecting their probabilities to win either of the prizes.
Two different numerical methods for finding pure strategy Nash equilibria are
employed. Depending on particular distributions of the abilities, we find two
possible scenarios when the second prize becomes optimal. Furthermore, we address
an issue of existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
with respect to the returns to scale in effort parameter.

Partneři

ČSOB
Deloitte
McKinsey & Company

Sponzoři

CRIF