Work detail

(In)efficiency of Regulation of Monopoly Power in Case of Vertical Product Differentiation and Dynamic Competition

Author: Bc. Lenka Gregorová
Year: 2004 - summer
Leaders: Ing. Ivo Koubek
Consultants:
Work type: Bachelors
Language: Czech
Pages: 46
Awards and prizes: B.A. with distinction from the Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences for an extraordinarily good bachelors diploma thesis
Link:
Abstract: Competition policy is often based on the concept of static efficiency achieved in the neoclassical model of perfect competition. The main goal of the bachelor thesis is to point to shortcomings of this concept in the real world and to show possible negative consequences of the regulation of monopoly power in two special cases. The first is the presence of vertical product differentiation. The author developed a model explaining how regulation by means of price ceilings and minimal quality standard may influence consumer utility. The model implies that the regulation can diminish a utility of some consumers. In the second case, the Austrian approach to competition (competition as a dynamic process), particularly Schumpeter's hypotheses, is considered. The author elaborates on the influence of the market structure on R&D investment and discusses how the regulation of a monopoly affects its innovation.
Downloadable: Bachelors Thesis - Gregorová

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