|Author:||PhDr. Martin Hokeš|
|Year:||2004 - summer|
|Leaders:|| prof. RNDr. Ing. František Turnovec CSc.
|Work type:|| Doctoral
|Awards and prizes:|
|Abstract:||The thesis Voting paradoxes analyses paradoxes of power and the role of abstention in measures of power.
The first part aims at fundamental concepts of power and common power indices and their axioms. The importance and relevance of these axioms, as binding conditions of power measures, is considered profoundly.
The second section presents practically all known voting paradoxes with emphasise on the paradoxes of power and introduces a new paradox, the Paradox of abstention. As a result of its analysis, it is proved that the concept of global monotonicity is less binding than it is believed, provided committees where posterior abstention is allowed are analysed with the use of binary indices of power, such as Shapley -- Shubik or Banzhaf - Coleman are.
The last section deals with the role of abstention and introduces a new model of power index based on non -- discriminatory tripartition. The empirical part uses this index for an analysis of the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic.