

The Lisbon Treaty and the Decision-Making in the EU Council:

Should We Expect a Policy Shift (?)

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Abstract

The paper points to the findings about the patterns of voting behaviour in the EU Council after the eastern enlargement and their possible consequences for the question of change of the decision-making rule as designed in the Lisbon Treaty. We have found distinct groups of member states representing the most probable members of coalitions in main policy areas. These findings allow us to formulate concrete hypotheses which we may try to test on the data collected, i.e. the records of proposals which were contested in the Council or which were accompanied by statement indicating dissent with the particular policy change. The pattern of voting of individual member states indicates that the relevance of the question of the blocking minorities may be overestimated as overwhelming majority of observations show that dissenting states hardly ever reach this criterion. The strength of the large countries seems to lie in the ability to bring together the coalition that supports the proposal which is being contested by some members. Testing the data by simulating the change of the decision-making rule does not contradict these conclusions.

Lisbon Treaty signed in December 2007 by 27 EU members represents up to now the last outcome of the long-term process of institutional change driven both by the continuous enlargement and the deepening of the political and economic integration. Decision-making rule for the Council of the EU stands as the most prominent topic in all the rounds of trials of the institutional change, being considered by the member states an embodiment of the principal of representation of the governments of the EU members. The topic, quite understandably, attracts both academic and political discussions. The Council, being the most powerful decision-making body of the EU, and the scope of the legislative powers of the European Union being constantly expanding, the attractiveness may be easily understood. This paper aims at pointing to the connection between the empirical findings about the decision-making in the Council after the eastern enlargement of the EU and the question of the change of the decision-making rule envisaged in the Lisbon Treaty.

The paper is structured as follows; first, the problem of the relationship between the process of the enlargement and the institutional reform in connection with the Council decision-making rule is briefly introduced; second, the voting power consequences of the new rule for the EU member states are presented, third findings of the recent empirical research on the decision-making in the Council after the eastern enlargement are discussed, and fourth, inference derived from the empirical research is used for testing a theoretical model of EU Council under Lisbon Treaty rule. Possible implications for the pattern of decision-making and EU policies under new rule are discussed.

I Institutional reform of the EU and decision-making rule for the EU Council

Political system of the European Union has undergone considerable change since its creation in 1993. We may see that the drive for the institutional reform grows in general higher; the external forces of the previous period (economic competitiveness and political cohesion of the Cold War alliances) were superseded by the internal factors, enlargement process being the most significant stimulus. We should remind that in case of the Council decision-making rule the first ‘enlargement’ of the 1990’s – reunification

of Germany was the most important. Reunified Germany came out as a nation which impaired the balance among European Community member countries – significantly more populous, economically stronger and politically motivated to achieve political status adequate to these factors. The request for corresponding changes in the EC/EU institutions came as a logical corollary in the early 1990's during the negotiations on the consequences of the reunification of Germany for the EC, but was resisted by the other member states (particularly, the request for higher number of votes in the Council for Germany was refused by France recalling the original deal on parity between the two countries from the time of establishing the European Coal and Steel Community in early 1950').¹ Even it may seem weird to evoke circumstances that old in connection with the institutional reform of the EU in recent period, we argue that this single factor, i.e. the aspiration of Germany for adequate political status, influenced strongly the whole process and has significant consequences for the political choices on decision-making rules for the Council of the EU.

Next to Germany also the other large countries of the EU joined the demand for a change of the decision-making rules in the Council, as all the acceding EFTA countries and majority of the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe in that time awaiting the membership were small or medium sized. As a consequence the level of representation of the large countries would drop due to the degressively proportional allocation of votes in relation to the size of the population of the member country.

In mid-1990' with the EFTA enlargement imminent, the new democracies of the Central and Eastern Europe seeking the accession to the EU and the reform IGC approaching the request for adjustment of the main institutional triangle – the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament – appeared back on the table, this time connected with the question of the effectiveness of the legislative process in an enlarged EU. It seemed logical that the EU would not be able to operate as before with membership grown significantly reaching up to 30 in ten to fifteen year's time horizon. As a result the Amsterdam Treaty (AT) and to a lesser degree the Nice Treaty (NT) extended the range of the application of the qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council. The argument connecting the expected slow-down or even standstill of the legislative process after the "big bang" enlargement with the extended use of QM voting as a tool how to prevent it

is still around after four years after the eastern enlargement, even it became clear that the experience testifies against it.

To mention also other factors entering the debate in recent period – these are clear demand for higher standard of political legitimacy (evident since the ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty) and transparency (arriving in the end of the 1990'), both became an integral part of the reform debate ever since.

As a result of these factors the decision-making rule for the Council was changed in the Nice Treaty in 2001, the scale of weighted votes allocated to member countries being extended from 2 to 10 votes to 3 to 29 votes, the large countries being accommodated in their demand for higher share of votes. Germany has not succeeded to win more votes than the other three large partners, once again reminded by French president Jacques Chirac about the deal on parity between France and Germany, but was able to put through additional criterion for defining the qualified majority in the Council, the possibility to check whether the qualified majority of votes supporting the proposals qualifies at the same time for at least 62 percent of population of the EU. This criterion gives Germany the symbolic difference in representation in the Council compared to the other large countries, allowing her blocking the proposal with only two allies while the others need three as minimum.

Even the institutional reform of the NT was considered to be the precondition for the eastern enlargement, the result was strongly criticized for various reasons and opened up a new phase of institutional reform started by the Convention on the future of the EU convened in 2002 which produced the Draft treaty on Constitution for Europe in July 2003, followed by the Constitutional Treaty signed in October 2004 and refused in French and Dutch referenda in 2005 and rounded out – up to now – by the signature of the second version of the treaty in December 2007 in Lisbon. The reform of the decision-making rule for the Council was repeatedly the most controversial and contested item of the reform agenda, finally bringing substantial change in the rule but also significant delay in its application envisaged for 2014, or in fact 2017. If the ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty was successful the system of weighted votes would be replaced by two-criteria rule combining the weights given by proportional share of population of each member state with the threshold on 65 per cent and the

majority of member states at the level of 55 per cent. Additional rule would be that the blocking minority has to be represented by no less than four countries (35 per cent of population plus one member state) – provision with the sole purpose to equalize the blocking coalition potential of the six largest member countries.

II Voting power consequences of the Lisbon Treaty rule

Lisbon Treaty confirmed that the EU is based on democratic principles (equality of citizens, representative and participatory democracy, etc.)(TEU, Title II, Art. 9, 10). New decision-making rule was presented originally as solving the problems of legitimacy, democratic representation and transparency – bringing seemingly straightforward solution to the double source of representation – of the people of the member states and the member states. Unfortunately, such a construction of the decision-making rule does not have an effect that is being expected. Voting power analysis of the decision-making rules in the EU Council (e.g. Felsenthal – Machover 2004, 2007; Leech 2002; Plechanovová 2004) shows that the new rule would shift the distribution of power significantly. Germany, for years having less power than a due share according to the number of its population, would suddenly be given capacity by almost 25 per cent higher than appropriate. Also the other members of the ‘big four’ would gain significantly, as well as the small member countries.

This paper does not aim to provide a thorough voting power analysis of the Council decision-making rule envisaged in the Lisbon Treaty as that was already done by the articles referred to and by many others. Voting power is a notion which allows us to measure the influence of the member of the decision-making body. The voting power (VP) of an actor may be expressed by the measure of her/his presence in a ‘swing’ position in all winning coalitions that would turn into losing ones by the defection of this actor. ‘Swing’ position here means a position that enables the member to pull the coalition down by a swing of her/his own vote. Here we would like to stress the main points: construction of the decision-making rules using weighted votes is a very tricky thing. The designer approaching the task of allotting the weights to members of the decision-making body indicates by the given weight what share of influence the given

actor should have. But the weights alone do not make the decision-making rule. A threshold of the weighted votes specifies what level the expected majority should have. In case when the distribution of the weights is as lopsided as is the case of the distribution of population in the member countries of the European Union, there is a problem: certain actors may finally have more power than is the share of their weighted votes, others may have less power. An example of the shareholding company with three shareholders having 51, 29 and 20 shares each may indicate what can happen in extreme cases. In the company where simple majority applies, the first shareholder has 100 per cent of the voting power, the other two have no voting power at all. Similar case is the EU Council, luckily not so extreme.

Second problem is connected to the first and has to do with the application of the democratic principle 'one person one vote' (OPOV) in a system with two levels of delegation and the principle of equality of citizens being respected by all EU institutions. On the first level the citizens vote to the national parliament, the government is created then and on the second level its representative in the Council takes the decision. It is clear that the voting power of the individual voter on the first level is not the same across the EU – probability that an individual voter would be able to influence which candidate would become a member of the national parliament, i.e. being in the swing position, is very low anywhere, but in general is much lower in more populous countries than in countries with less citizens, e.g. the Czech voter has app. three times as much voting power in the parliamentary election than the German voter. It is also clear that the government in democratic system does not represent all the citizens/voters of its country but only its majority, i.e. the voters who voted in the parliamentary elections for the party/ies forming the government. The decision-making rule envisaged in the Lisbon Treaty does not reflect these two problems mentioned and significantly changes the distribution of power in the Council in favour of the large and small countries and to the detriment of the majority of EU member countries with medium sized population, introducing from the point of view of the citizens of the EU the least equitable ruleⁱⁱ the Council ever had (Table 1).

Lisbon Treaty rule gives more voting power to all member countries as it lowers the threshold of 'weighted/population' votes from app. 72 percent to only 65 percent. The

probability of proposal being adopted rises significantly then, as may be seen from comparison of the the sum of the absolute VP indices (Table 1). But in relative terms this raise is distributed extremely unproportionally as indicated by the relative VP index and particularly by the index of equitability (Table 1, last column; Figure 1), which should be equal to 1; if it is lower, the individual voter is underrepresented, if it is higher the voter has actually more influence than s/he should have. Standard deviation (std) is used as a measure of the overall equitability of the decision-making rule, ideal value is 0, higher the value, the less equitable the rule is.

Table 1

Figure 1

III EU Council after the eastern enlargement

This section presents the findings of the empirical research on voting behaviour of the EU member states during the period after the eastern enlargement. The debate around the decision-making in the EU Council provoked a considerable interest in the empirical research, the policy of transparency allowing the access to relatively wide segment of the EU institutions' documents. Findings presented here are based on the results of a project aiming at creating database of all proposals on which the Council on the ministerial level took decision after the eastern enlargement. The database was created by a thorough data survey of the Council documents for the period between May 2004 the end of December 2008¹, source documents being the provisional agendas of the Council meetings, lists of A points, Council minutes, monthly summaries of the Council acts and Council press releases, occasionally the data were cross checked and added also from the PreLex database. The basic aim was to identify positions of member governments towards all these proposals, i.e. to have the information if the proposal was approved by consensus (defined as unanimity), or whether the Council took vote and in that case what the positions of individual members of the Council were. Consequently this information should allow to assess the present theoretical claims about the coalition behaviour of the EU members in the Council and to compare the findings with the results of the empirical research on the Council decision-making before the eastern enlargement.

In total, more than 6000 proposals were identified by the survey, of which for app. 3,4 percent no relevant or complete data were available – key documents or their pertinent parts were not available from the Council web register and/or were not provided by the Council secretariat, or the documents indicate that voting took place but the positions of the dissenting governments were not put into the records (0,8 percent).

¹ In its final shape the database will cover period up to June 2009, i.e. five years.

Consequently, the basic data set consists of 6068 proposals. From the basic data set 369 were contested proposals – 6,1 percent, proposals on which at least one member state voted against or abstained and for which the voting records were available. Additional 171 proposals were accompanied by statement of at least one of the member states. These proposals represent the basic subset, which was subject of further analysis. Therefore, we have three possible voting positions (yes = 1, abstain = 2, no = 3) and four positions of statements (no statement (NS) = 0; not far enough (NFE) = 1; wrong measures (WM) = 2; disapproval (DIS) = 3). We choose an approach to the content of the statements, which allows converting the voting positions in combination with the content of the statements into a binary data. We assume that the alternative position of member states is a binary relation; either the member states votes “yes” or casts a dissenting vote (“no” or “abstained”).ⁱⁱⁱ Majority of the statements are attached to the positive votes but of these 38 percent indicate willingness to follow the path of the policy approved even further (NFE), whereas 62 percent are a sign of serious discontent with the substance or the form of the policy. On the other hand, once we manipulate the voting positions, we may assume that the abstention accompanied by statement of type NFE in fact means that the member state supports the proposal² (Table 2). We do not follow the same path in case of „no“ vote combined with NFE statement as we assume that there must be most probably additional reason for negative vote which is not reflected in the content of the statement.

After the data were collected and transformed, cluster analysis was applied to the data set of the contested proposals with the aim to identify the patterns of behaviour of the members of the Council (Hayes-Renshaw – Van Aken – Wallace 2006). Cluster analysis is an exploratory data analysis tool which aims at sorting different objects into groups in a

² Even if this would not be the case, the number of cases with this combination of positions is so small that the statistical assessment of the data should not be influenced in any significant way.

way that the degree of association between two objects is maximal if they belong to the same group and minimal otherwise. Given the above, the method can be used to discover structures in data without providing an explanation/interpretation, i.e. it discovers structures in data without explaining why they exist. This 'first trial' method should help us to assess the general structure of the data, i.e. how the voting behaviour distributes the EU member states into groups/clusters.

Analysis of the data brings an output in a form of dendrogram outlining the mode of clustering of the objects – member states of the EU, being shaped by the distance matrix as its input. The clusters are identified by closed branches of vertical lines representing individual member states in horizontal direction: the higher the closing, the more distant position the state has to its neighbour/s. Results of the cluster analysis serve us as a source of hypothesis we will try to test in the next step of the analysis.

And is there any relevant information we may derive from the empirical analysis of the decision-making in the Council after the first eastern enlargement that can elucidate our research on the effect of the new decision-making rule? Special attention should be given to the behaviour of the large members, which would gain a lot with application of the new rule. As we are interested in influence of the decision-making rule on EU policies, we have analyzed the data in the main policy areas where open voting occurs regularly, i.e. in common agricultural policy, commercial policy and competition policy, environmental policy, and home affairs. We get five different dendrograms – for all the data and for four subsets for each of the identified policy sector. Even the pictures differ they are in certain respect similar: the member states cluster into small number of groups – two or three – and we can always identify one group that encompasses majority of the member states, with the smallest distances among them, compared to the others. Therefore, we may assume that this large group represents the most probable winning coalition, either across the board or in particular policy areas.

The large member states in fact seem to have a special position in majority of the constelations. Germany, Britain, Italy and Poland come on most dendrograms as the last ones to one of the groups, on the other hand, France and Spain are always seated in the centre of the large group. We may hypothesize that Germany, Italy, Britain and Poland

use often their veto power to stretch the policy in the direction of their ideal point, and sometimes they are not successful and end up in losing coalition. France and Spain do not behave in a same way. They contest proposals very rarely and prefer to end up in winning coalition, even the policy adopted need not correspond with their preferences. The large groups within the dendrogram, i.e. the most probable composition of the winning coalition, will serve as testing ground for the model of the EU Council under the Lisbon Treaty rule.

IV Decision-making under Lisbon Treaty rule

The model of the decision-making in the EU Council under the Lisbon Treaty provision on the decision-making rule is based on several assumptions, not all are totally realistic but under given conditions they simply cannot be. The model is constructed on the empirical findings about the voting behaviour of the EU member states after the eastern enlargement, from 2004 to 2008. The model is then showing the changes assuming the EU is having 27 members even we know that it is not reality any more and that in 2014 or 2017 when the new decision-making rule for the Council is expected to be fully applicable the EU can have several more new members. Still, the model can show that the gravity in the power distribution would shift significantly and this very probably may have serious impact both on the behaviour of the member states and on the shape of policies approved by the Council.

The model is represented by a simplified version of the Lisbon Treaty rule, which takes into account only the change from the distribution of weighted votes to the distribution of weights given by the size of the member state's population. Taken into consideration that in the empirical data collected we were not able to distinguish in all cases whether the individual proposal was decided by the ordinary qualified majority rule or by unanimity or a special qualified majority rule, we do not consider this a major distortion. Therefore, we take our results of the empirical analysis, the most probable winning coalitions for the five datasets; for all contested proposals and the four policy areas. We look at the cohesion of these coalitions, i.e. what is the probability that the coalition

reaches the qualified majority threshold. In the next step, we look what happens with the group and its cohesion when the new decision-making rule is introduced. Next, we assess what kind of policy implications the change may have. We have a look both at the position of the members of the coalition and on the particular policy proposals affected by the change. Finally, we look at the position of Germany in the new institutional setting as this country is the main winner of the decision-making rule change and the empirical analysis shows that Germany is always a member of the most probable winning coalition, even in most cases somewhat detached from the majority of the other members.

Figures 2 to 6

Based on the results of the cluster analysis we identify five variants of the most probable winning coalitions. If we take all the contested proposals across the board, the group is the largest; it has 22 members and 279 votes. In areas of agricultural policy and commercial policy and competition, the size of the group is the same, i.e. 22 members, but the number of votes is lower, 255 and 265 respectively. Area of environmental policy has smaller winning coalition, 20 members with 256 votes, and justice and home affairs of 22 members with 279 votes. (Table 2) The sequence of the member states in the table is given by the distance at which they join the first small cluster on the left side within the larger cluster/group of the winning coalition. In all dendrograms Germany is member of this small cluster, either alone or accompanied by other member states.

We see that all groups represent either the minimal winning coalition or a coalition although theoretically not minimal but the probability that the members that may be redundant would cast a negative vote is very low, with the exception of justice and home affairs. Albeit the fact that the empirical analysis identifies a clearly visible line dividing the most probable members of the winning coalition from the most probable members of the losing coalition can be considered an argument for the relevance of the decision-

making rule in EU Council decision-making. More so, that the winning coalition is in practical terms a minimal winning coalition, i.e. the behaviour of the EU member states seems to correspond with the rational assumptions of the minimal winning coalition theory (Riker, 1962). Therefore, in all these coalitions the position of the large countries is essential, as they are the only relevant veto players, i.e. the players the coalition cannot be without.

Table 2

When we take into consideration all contested proposals, Germany, Italy and Poland are the most probable veto players. As the distances between Germany and the other two are quite wide, also Britain may occasionally play this role in relation to the potential winning coalition. In sectoral policy areas, the situation is little bit different, as the differences in distribution of preferences shows up. In agricultural policy, the large member states are really divided; Germany and Poland are within the winning coalition, whereas Britain and Italy stay quite appart, very probably in opposition. In comercial policy and competition policy, Britain and Poland stay outside of the winning coalition. In environmental policy, only Italy stays in probable oppostion to all other large member states, who are part of the winning group. Finally, justice and home affairs are interesting because the winning coalition reaches the highest cohesion, i.e. the probability that all members of the group are supporting the particular proposal within JHA is 95 percent. Looking to other policy areas, we also see very high cohesion of the winning coalitions, from 87 to 93 percent (Table 3).

Table 3

And what would happen if all the legislation would be decided according to the Lisbon Treaty decision-making rule? The main indication is given by Table xxx. All the minimal winning coalitions would become smaller, the difference being one to five redundant member states on the condition that the member states would not change their

behaviour, which on the other hand can be expected. The main problem for most of the member states will be that their relative value for the winning coalition will decline, which may eventually apply even for the large countries, taking into consideration their distance from the winning coalition. What political consequences may we expect?

Considering the general distribution of member states across all policies, it will be much harder to try to build a blocking minority. Therefore, we can expect that member states will tend to change their strategies. As the minimal winning coalitions will get smaller and the cohesion of the smaller coalitions will stay practically on the same level, we may expect a centripetal effect, i.e. even the member states, which up to now stayed often in opposition, may be tempted to get more near to the core of the minimal winning coalition. The size of the country and eventual side-payments to the coalition-builder may decide whose preferences are going to be accommodated in future. Poland will lose her veto position, which for sure helped her in recent years to influence a number of legislative proposals according to her preferences. Justice and home affairs may illustrate that a large group of nine smaller member states (including Poland) may lose its influence after the rule change.

We may see also large number of proposals where the group of member states of the winning coalition (C-all) does not reach to the qualified majority threshold under the Nice rule but would reach it under the Lisbon rule. Approximately one third of these 118 cases were agricultural and fisheries legislation, followed by commercial policy and environmental policy legislation.

What seems to be a key finding of the present analysis is the confirmation of the expectations based on voting power analysis of the Lisbon Treaty decision-making rule. Germany ends up as a clear winner of the EU institutional game. Her key position in all policy areas winning coalitions is confirmed, considering the distribution of the preferences, Germany cannot be easily overrun by coalition of opponents, as may be seen from Figure 7, picturing the sequence EU member states joining Germany as a coalition builder on proposals, which Germany supported in the EU Council. When considering the overall distribution of votes in the Council we may see that the power shift of Germany compared to the other large countries is even bigger than the voting power analysis would indicate (Figure 8). Germany would end up on the winning side on

all of those 118 proposals where the change of the decision-making rule would result in change of the result for the C-all group.

Figure 7 to 8

Discussion

What kind of implications could be expected from the rule change on the basis of the findings presented? As the results of the empirical research on decision-making in the EU after the eastern enlargement are not yet fully established, the findings are presented in the form of a discussion.

What seems to be supported is: first, that the new rule would make it little bit easier to adopt the proposal as indicated by the results of the voting power analysis, the growth of membership of winning coalitions reaching the QM threshold and the decline of the membership of successful blocking minority coalitions. Second, that majority of member states would lose relative weight with the new rule (actually all except the large ones) and all the medium sized countries would lose voting power. The model of the Lisbon Treaty rule supports this finding, as the cluster representing the winning coalition may get smaller after the rule change. Third, the significant relative gain of Germany as compared to other large countries is confirmed.

What may be the consequences for the policies of the EU? The results of simulation of the new rule on the data on voting of EU 27 would seem to indicate that there is no immediate major change on the horizon, but a change in voting behaviour of the member states may be expected. The number of different outcomes of the vote for the winning coalition group C-all seems also significant.

Large countries as the members requesting the reform of the decision-making rule for the Council recalling mainly to the level of the blocking power as the main reason for their demand, seem not to behave in a way that would show that they really care about this blocking potential. Opposite seems plausible; as we find the large countries mostly in the winning coalition backing the proposal, which is at the end adopted or as a

solitary actor casting a protest vote, we subsume that they use their voting power primarily to put the legislation through. We may, of course, speculate about the amount of legislation, which has not seen the light of the day because it was from the very beginning clear that it had not any chance to be adopted by the major actors. Hence what seems to be of the utmost importance is the change of the position of the large countries at the beginning of the legislative process. For the Commission as an agenda-setter the large members are the most important partners with whom the legislative proposals are consulted before the official proposal is presented to the EU institutions taking part in the legislative process. If these member states who theoretically can most easily form the blocking minority do not oppose the proposal, the Commission may proceed. The number of partners for these consultations needed for securing this aim declines, as well as the number of partners the large member states need for negotiating their 'common position' for the particular legislative proposal. In these consultations the small members would be as valuable partners as the medium-sized countries because the only reason for finding more members of the coalition would be to pass the threshold of the 55 percent of member states as the population threshold would be sufficed by the large countries. As a consequence, the political preferences of a significantly smaller part of EU members/EU citizens might be translated into the priorities of the whole EU.

More efficient decision-making which was the most often cited argument for the need of change of the rule for the Council has also its reverse side. The number of national positions overruled by the newly defined majority would inevitably rise. Since the voting power analysis points to the problem of the equitability deficit of the new rule, this would in the long run inevitably bring about rising level of discontent of the member state governments concerned, deepening the problem of the democratic deficit of the EU, and in domestic politics showing as rising level of euro sceptic attitudes and declining level of support of the integration project. Such trends would inevitably have very negative impact on the EU policies and may in the long run have quite opposite implications than those expected by the designer of the institutional change.

Tables and figures

Table 1 Voting power and equitability – Nice Treaty and Lisbon Treaty – EU 27

Country	Population	Nice votes	Lisbon weights	Nice VP Banzhaf abs.	Nice VP Banzhaf rel.	Nice Equitability	Lisbon VP Banzhaf abs.	Lisbon VP Banzhaf rel.	Lisbon Equitability
D	82438	29	167	0,0327	0,0778	0,8219	0,2016	0,1161	1,2264
F	62886	29	128	0,0327	0,0778	0,9410	0,1564	0,09	1,0885
GB	60393	29	123	0,0327	0,0778	0,9602	0,1508	0,0868	1,0713
I	58752	29	119	0,0327	0,0778	0,9735	0,1466	0,0844	1,0561
E	43758	27	89	0,0312	0,0742	1,0759	0,1135	0,0653	0,9468
P	38157	27	77	0,0312	0,0742	1,1521	0,0985	0,0567	0,8804
RM	21610	14	44	0,0179	0,0426	0,8789	0,072	0,0415	0,8562
NL	16334	13	33	0,0167	0,0397	0,9422	0,0605	0,0348	0,8259
GR	11125	12	23	0,0155	0,0368	1,0582	0,0503	0,029	0,8339
PT	10570	12	21	0,0155	0,0368	1,0857	0,0483	0,0278	0,8201
B	10511	12	21	0,0155	0,0368	1,0887	0,0483	0,0278	0,8224
CZ	10251	12	21	0,0155	0,0368	1,1024	0,0483	0,0278	0,8328
HU	10077	12	20	0,0155	0,0368	1,1119	0,0473	0,0272	0,8218
S	9048	10	18	0,0130	0,0309	0,9853	0,0452	0,026	0,829
AU	8266	10	17	0,0130	0,0309	1,0308	0,0442	0,0255	0,8507
BG	7719	10	16	0,0130	0,0309	1,0667	0,0432	0,0249	0,8596
DK	5428	7	11	0,0092	0,0218	0,8975	0,0381	0,0219	0,9016
SK	5389	7	11	0,0092	0,0218	0,9007	0,0381	0,0219	0,9048
FN	5256	7	11	0,0092	0,0218	0,9120	0,0381	0,0219	0,9162
IR	4209	7	9	0,0092	0,0218	1,0192	0,0361	0,0208	0,9724
LI	3403	7	7	0,0092	0,0218	1,1335	0,034	0,0196	1,0191
LA	2295	4	5	0,0053	0,0125	0,7914	0,032	0,0184	1,1649
SL	2003	4	4	0,0053	0,0125	0,8471	0,0309	0,0178	1,2063
ES	1345	4	3	0,0053	0,0125	1,0338	0,0299	0,0172	1,4225
CY	766	4	2	0,0053	0,0125	1,3699	0,0289	0,0166	1,8192
L	460	4	1	0,0053	0,0125	1,7677	0,0279	0,016	2,2627
ML	404	3	1	0,0040	0,0094	1,4185	0,0279	0,016	2,4144
total	492853	345	1002	0,4208	1		1,7369	1	
std.						0,2061			0,426

Figure 1




Figure 2




Figure 3




Figure 4




Figure 5




Figure 6




Figure 7




Table 2

Winning coalitions under the Nice Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty decision-making rules

all	D	AU	F	E	PT	IR	GR	L	CY	ML	CZ	SK	LI	HU	SL	BL	RO	LA	ES	B	I	P
NT	29	10	29	27	12	7	12	4	4	3	12	7	7	12	4	10	14	4	4	12	29	27
LT	81802	8375	64714	45989	10638	4456	11295	502	798	413	10507	5425	3329	10013	2047	7564	21462	2248	1340	10827	60340	38167

agri	D	ES	B	LA	L	ML	BL	E	AU	SL	F	HU	SK	RO	PT	LI	P	FN	IR	CZ	CY	S
NT	29	4	12	4	4	3	10	27	10	4	29	12	7	14	12	7	27	7	7	12	4	10
LT	81802	1340	10827	2248	502	413	7564	45989	8375	2047	64714	10013	5425	21462	10638	3329	38167	5351	4456	10507	798	9341

comer	D	IR	CZ	I	F	GR	AU	BL	RO	HU	B	E	CY	ML	PT	SK	LA	SL	DK	I	NL	ES
NT	29	7	4	4	29	12	10	10	14	12	12	27	12	3	12	7	4	4	7	29	13	4
LT	81802	4456	798	502	64714	11295	8375	7564	21462	10013	10827	45989	10507	413	10638	5425	2248	2047	5535	60340	16578	1340


envi	D	F	LI	ES	L	BL	RO	SK	LA	SL	NL	CZ	HU	ML	P	FN	CY	GB	E	AU
NT	29	29	7	4	4	10	14	7	4	4	13	12	12	3	27	7	4	29	27	10
LT	81802	64714	3329	1340	502	7564	21462	5425	2248	2047	16578	10507	10013	413	38167	5351	798	62008	45989	8375

jha	D	IR	CY	AU	F	I	RO	BL	E	PT	ML	HU	GR	L	SK	LI	B	P	LA	ES	CZ	SL
NT	29	7	4	10	29	29	14	10	27	12	3	12	12	4	7	7	12	27	4	4	12	4
LT	81802	4456	798	8375	64714	60340	21462	7564	45989	10638	413	10013	11295	502	5425	3329	10827	38167	2248	1340	10507	2047

Table 2 Cohesion of the winning coalitions – policy areas

		cohesion of the winning coalition%	votes of the winning coalition	population of the winning coalition	dif. pop.
C-all	NT	0,89	279		
	LT	0,88		364084	38392
C-agri	NT	0,90	255		
	LT	0,85		335170	9478
C-comer	NT	0,87	265		
	LT	0,90		364950	39258
C-envi	NT	0,93	256		
	LT	0,91		334269	8577
C-jha	NT	0,95	279		
	LT	0,95		327859	19494
	threshold		255	325692	

Figure 8



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ⁱ Paradoxically, the political deal between France and Germany on equal status within the ECSC was considered to be a concession to Germany which in that time strived to get rid of the status of an occupied country and the stigma of the defeated nation of the World War II.

ⁱⁱ Equitability is in this case a measure of representation of individual citizen/voter given by the voting power of the member state and its size of population/electorate. For more detailed definition see e.g. Plechanovová 2004.

ⁱⁱⁱ This assumption holds in case of the QM rule of decision-making as the effect of the negative vote and abstention is the same.