Detail publikace

Centralization Trade-off with Non-Uniform Taxes

Autor: doc. PhDr. Martin Gregor Ph.D., Peter Tuchyňa
Typ: IES Working Papers
Rok: 2005
Číslo: 81
ISSN / ISBN:
Publikováno v: IES WP 2005/81
Místo vydání: Prague
Klíčová slova: Decentralization, Local Public Goods, Distributive Politics, Political Economy
JEL kódy: H40, H70, H72, P51
Citace:
Granty: GACR 402/05/H510 Ekonomická teorie politických trhů Výzkumný záměr IES (2005-2011) Integrace české ekonomiky do Evropské unie a její rozvoj
Abstrakt: When local public goods are provided by a centralized authority, spillovers may be coordinated, but heterogeneity in preferences may be suppressed. Besley and Coate (2003) have already solved this classic trade-off for a uniform tax regime. Here, we extend their approach by allowing for a non-uniform tax regime. We find that centralization with our tax system necessarily increases welfare in comparison to uniform-tax centralization. Importantly, with non-cooperative legislators coming from homogenous districts, our centralization dominates decentralization for any degree of spillovers. In other cases, it at least improves odds of centralization, if measured by utilitarian yardstick.
Ke stažení: WP 81_Tuchyna Gregor
Leden 2021
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