Publication detail

Political Economy of Public Deficit: Perspectives for Constitutional Reform

Author(s): doc. PhDr. Adam Geršl Ph.D.,
Type: IES Working Papers
Year: 2005
Number: 98
ISSN / ISBN:
Published in: IES WP 2005/98
Publishing place: Prague
Keywords: fiscal policy; dynamic inconsistency; political economy; public deficit
JEL codes: E61, E63, P16
Suggested Citation:
Abstract: The paper uses a dynamic inconsistency model known from monetary policy to assess three alternative proposals how to reform fiscal constitution in order to limit government’s incentive to use fiscal policy for maximizing political support. The return to ever-balanced-budget rule, state-contingent rules, and the establishment of an independent Fiscal Policy Committee with power to set public deficit with the aim of stabilizing the economy are discussed from the constitutional perspective, analyzing different incentives that these proposals create for government and alternative means to enhance credibility of the arrangement.
Downloadable: WP 98_Gersl

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