Autor: |
prof. Ing. Karel Janda M.A., Dr., Ph.D.,
|
Typ: |
IES Working Papers |
Rok: |
2008 |
Číslo: |
12 |
ISSN / ISBN: |
|
Publikováno v: |
IES Working Papers 12/2008 |
Místo vydání: |
Prague |
Klíčová slova: |
information asymmetry, credit, guarantees, subsidies |
JEL kódy: |
D82, G18, H25 |
Citace: |
Janda, K. (2008). “ Which Government Interventions Are Good in Alleviating Credit Market Failures? ” IES Working Paper 12/2008. IES FSV. Charles University. |
Granty: |
Výzkumný záměr IES (2005-2011) Integrace české ekonomiky do Evropské unie a její rozvoj
|
Abstrakt: |
Credit contracting between a lender with a market power and a small start-up entrepreneur may lead to a rejection of projects whose expected benefits are higher than their total costs when an adverse selection is present. This inefficiency may be eliminated by a government support in the form of credit guarantees or subsidies. The principal-agent model of this paper compares different forms of government support and concludes that a guarantee defined as a proportion of a gross interest rate is not a sufficiently robust policy instrument. Lump-sum guarantees and interest rate subsidies are evaluated as better instruments because they have a nonambiguous positive effect on a social efficiency since they enable funding of socially efficient projects which would not be financed otherwise. |
Ke stažení: |
WP 2008_12_Janda
|