Publication detail

Mobile criminals, immobile crime: the efficiency of decentralized crime deterrence

Author(s): doc. PhDr. Martin Gregor Ph.D.,
PhDr. Lenka Šťastná Ph.D.,
Type: IES Working Papers
Year: 2009
Number: 18
ISSN / ISBN:
Published in: IES Working Papers 18/2009
Publishing place: Prague
Keywords: crime mobility; crime deterrence; decentralization; strategic delegation; side payments
JEL codes: H41; H73; H76; R50
Suggested Citation: Gregor, M., Šťastná, L. (2009). “ Mobile criminals, immobile crime: the efficiency of decentralized crime deterrence ” IES Working Paper 18/2009. IES FSV. Charles University.
Grants: GACR 402/08/0501 (2008-2010) Political Economy of Public Spending
Abstract: In this paper we examine a class of local crimes that involve perfectly mobile criminals, and perfectly immobile criminal opportunities. We focus on local non-rival crime deterrence that is more efficient against criminals pursuing domestic crimes than criminals pursuing crimes elsewhere. In a standard case of sincerely delegated politicians and zero transfers to other districts, we show that centralized deterrence unambiguously dominates the decentralized deterrence. With strategic delegation and voluntary in-kind transfers, the tradeoff is exactly the opposite: Decentralization achieves the social optimum, whereas cooperative centralization overprovides for enforcement. This is robust to various cost-sharing modes. We also examine the effects of the growing interdependence of districts, stemming from criminals' increasing opportunities to strategically displace. Contrary to the supposition in Oates's decentralization theorem, increasing interdependence makes centralization less desirable.
Downloadable: WP 2009_18_Gregor, Stastna

Partners

Deloitte

Sponsors

CRIF
McKinsey
Patria Finance