Detail publikace

Strict Proportional Power and Fair Voting Rules in Committees

Autor: † prof. RNDr. Ing. František Turnovec CSc.,
Typ: Kapitoly v knize
Rok: 2011
Číslo: 0
ISSN / ISBN: 978-5-9924-0069-4
Publikováno v: Petrosyan L.G. and N. A. Zenkevich (eds), Contribution to Game Theory and Management IV
Místo vydání: St. Petersburg University and The International Society of Dynamic Games, St. Petersburg
Klíčová slova: Fairness, optimal quota, simple weighted committee, strict proportional power, voting and power indices
JEL kódy: C71, D72, H77
Citace: Turnovec F. (2011), Strict Proportional Power and Fair Voting Rules in Committees. In: Petrosyan L.G. and N. A. Zenkevich (eds), Contribution to Game Theory and Management IV, St. Petersburg University and The International Society of Dynamic Games, St. Petersburg, pp. 473-488.
Granty: GACR 402/08/0501 (2008-2010) Politická ekonomie veřejných rozpočtů
Abstrakt: In simple weighted committees with a finite number n of members, fixed weights and changing quota, there exists a finite number r of different quota intervals of stable power (r ≤ 2n − 1) with the same sets of winning coalitions for all quotas from each of them. If in a committee the
sets of winning coalitions for different quotas are the same, then the power
indices based on pivots, swings, or minimal winning coalitions are also the same for those quotas. If the fair distribution of voting weights is defined, then the fair distribution of voting power means to find a quota that minimizes the distance between relative voting weights and relative voting power (optimal quota). The problem of the optimal quota has an exact solution
via the finite number of quotas from different intervals of stable power.
Ke stažení: Contributions to Game Theory and Management IV, 473-488
Srpen 2022
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