Publication detail

Strict Proportional Power and Fair Voting Rules in Committees

Author(s): † prof. RNDr. Ing. František Turnovec CSc.,
Type: Chapter in book
Year: 2011
Number: 0
ISSN / ISBN: 978-5-9924-0069-4
Published in: Petrosyan L.G. and N. A. Zenkevich (eds), Contribution to Game Theory and Management IV
Publishing place: St. Petersburg University and The International Society of Dynamic Games, St. Petersburg
Keywords: Fairness, optimal quota, simple weighted committee, strict proportional power, voting and power indices
JEL codes: C71, D72, H77
Suggested Citation: Turnovec F. (2011), Strict Proportional Power and Fair Voting Rules in Committees. In: Petrosyan L.G. and N. A. Zenkevich (eds), Contribution to Game Theory and Management IV, St. Petersburg University and The International Society of Dynamic Games, St. Petersburg, pp. 473-488.
Grants: GACR 402/08/0501 (2008-2010) Political Economy of Public Spending
Abstract: In simple weighted committees with a finite number n of members, fixed weights and changing quota, there exists a finite number r of different quota intervals of stable power (r ≤ 2n − 1) with the same sets of winning coalitions for all quotas from each of them. If in a committee the
sets of winning coalitions for different quotas are the same, then the power
indices based on pivots, swings, or minimal winning coalitions are also the same for those quotas. If the fair distribution of voting weights is defined, then the fair distribution of voting power means to find a quota that minimizes the distance between relative voting weights and relative voting power (optimal quota). The problem of the optimal quota has an exact solution
via the finite number of quotas from different intervals of stable power.
Downloadable: Contributions to Game Theory and Management IV, 473-488

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