Publication detail

Dictatorship versus Manipulability Dilemma

Author(s): † prof. RNDr. Ing. František Turnovec CSc.,
Type: Article in collection
Year: 2012
Number: 0
ISSN / ISBN: ISBN 978-80-225-3426-0
Published in: Reiff, M. and Lukacik, M. (eds.), Proceedings of the International Scientific Conference QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN ECONOMICS, Multiple Criteria Decision Making XVI, Vydavateĺstvo Ekonom, Bratislava. (Listed in the Thomson Reuters ISI Index to Social Science
Publishing place: Bratislava
Keywords: Arrow’s theorem, dictatorship, Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, manipulability, strategic voting
JEL codes: D71
Suggested Citation: Turnovec F. (2012), Dictatorship versus Manipulability dilemma, in: Reiff, M. and Lukacik, M. (eds.), Proceedings of the International Scientific Conference QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN ECONOMICS, Multiple Criteria Decision Making XVI, Vydavateĺstvo Ekonom, Bratislava, pp. 226-230.
Grants: GACR 402/08/0501 (2008-2010) Political Economy of Public Spending
Abstract: By voting we mean the following pattern of collective choice: There is a set of alternatives and a group of individuals. Individual preferences over the alternatives are exogenously specified and are supposed to be orderings. The group is required to choose an alternative on the basis of stating and aggregating of individual preferences, or to produce a ranking of alternatives from the most
preferred to the least preferred. In this paper concepts of manipulation as strategic voting (misrepresentation of true preferences) and dictatorship (voting procedure leads in all cases to social rankings that are identical with rankings of an individual) are investigated. The
connection between Arrow’s and Gibbard-Satterthwaite’s theorems is discussed from the viewpoint of dilemma between dictatorship and manipulability: there exists no voting procedure which satisfies at the same time non-dictatorship and non-manipulability.
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