Publication detail

Receiver's access fee for a single sender

Author(s): doc. PhDr. Martin Gregor Ph.D.,
Type: IES Working Papers
Year: 2014
Number: 17
Published in: IES Working Papers 17/2014
Publishing place: Prague
Keywords: disclosure, persuasion, hard evidence, access fee, lobbying
JEL codes: C72, C78, D72, D83
Suggested Citation: Gregor M. (2014). “Receiver's access fee for a single sender” IES Working Paper 17/2014. IES FSV. Charles University.
Abstract: We study a game in which a sender with verifiable private information has to pay
an access fee that is announced by a receiver to be able to convey her message to the
receiver. The setting is motivated by the literature of pay-and-lobby politics, which
finds that politicians decide to schedule informative meetings with lobbyists on the
basis of their campaign contributions. We solve the game for all timings, prior
beliefs, and noise and valuation parameters. We identify the receiver's tradeoff
between the amount of information and the amount of revenue. At the tradeoff, the
receiver decides to not receive an informative signal from the sender. Whether
`burying one's head in the sand' increases or decreases welfare depends on the
degree of the receiver's benevolence.
Downloadable: WP_2014_17_Gregor




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