Information complexity of strategic voting
|Author:||Mgr. Ján Palguta|
|Year:||2010 - summer|
|Leaders:|| † prof. RNDr. Ing. František Turnovec CSc.
|Work type:|| Economic Theory
|Awards and prizes:||M.A. with distinction from the Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences for an excellent state-final examination performance.|
|Abstract:||The thesis computationally simulates 10 different voting procedures for small numbers of voters and small numbers of competing alternatives so as to study the vulnerability of these procedures to strategic voting. This is followed by a study of vulnerability of strategic voting to the variation in the amount of information that individual strategic agents possess. The susceptibility to strategic voting is shown to be a function of the number of election participants, of the number of competing alternatives, of the used voting procedure and prominently of the amount of information that the individual voter holds about other voters’ voting preferences. Once we strip the agent of the full knowledge of the collective preference profile, we confirm the vulnerability of strategic voting both to an absolute and relative reduction in the amount of information. A minimal reduction in strategic agent’s holding of information severely threatens her ability of successful strategic manipulation.|
|Downloadable:|| Diploma Thesis of Palguta