Work detail

Economics of Crime: Rational Offender and Moral Costs of Crime

Author: Mgr. Milan Šilar
Year: 2011 - summer
Leaders: prof. Ing. Lubomír Mlčoch CSc.
Consultants:
Work type: Economic Theory
Masters
Language: Czech
Pages: 95
Awards and prizes:
Link:
Abstract: Main weakness of economics of crime is that it focuses on rational offender who
is isolated from society. This thesis gives overview of game theory models, which take
into account possible reactions of other actors to offender`s actions. I show that some
variables of crime are dependent on individual`s social environment and I analyze them
using moral costs of crime, where some gains and losses from crime are interconnected
between people. Two own models are presented. First model deals with aggregated
crime with significant role of moral costs of crime. Second model is a modification of
Inspection game which includes moral costs of crime and is than modeled using
evolutionary game theory. Result of first model is higher volatility of crime than in
standard models of rational offender. Crime is maximally volatile in time in the second
model. There is a critical level of moral costs of crime and after reaching this level,
assumptions of inspection game are violated and society converges to state with zero
crime. It is demonstrated on both models that crime is a self-propagating phenomenon,
because of social interactions.
Downloadable: Diploma Thesis of Šilar

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