Work detail

Understanding Information Asymmetries through Mechanism Design

Author: Mgr. Branislav Albert
Year: 2014 - summer
Leaders: RNDr. Michal Červinka Ph.D.
Consultants:
Work type: Finance, Financial Markets and Banking
Masters
Language: English
Pages: 65
Awards and prizes: M.A. with distinction from the Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences for an excellent state-final examination performance.
Link: https://is.cuni.cz/webapps/zzp/detail/138447/
Abstract: This thesis serves as an introduction and overview of the broad and closely related fields of mechanism
design, contract theory, and information economics. Each chapter is intended to provide a self-contained
guide to the particular area of application -- examples include adverse selection, moral hazard, and
auctions. The reader should benefit from the thesis in two ways: by understanding the general notions of
the revelation principle, incentive compatibility, and individual rationality from the mechanism design
theory as well as by examining the particular information asymmetry models in the individual areas.

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