Manipulating Verifiable Evidence
|Author:||Mgr. Jan Šedek|
|Year:||2015 - summer|
|Leaders:|| doc. PhDr. Martin Gregor Ph.D.
|Work type:|| Economic Theory
|Awards and prizes:|
|Abstract:||In this thesis we take the Bayesian persuasion model, impose a limitation on the signal space and
subsequently derive the first order conditions for the equilibrium. Then we enhance the model for
several different constraints. We find that the analysis is greatly facilitated if such constraints do not
relax when more signals are added to the model. The first type of constraint is imposed to eliminate the
perfectly informative persuasion mechanisms. The second type of constraint limits the total uncertainty
reduction caused by the persuasion. Finally the third type of constraint is a participation constraint. It
ensures a certain level of reservation utility for the persuaded party.