Manipulation through Evaluative Voting in the State Cinematography Fund
|Autor:||Bc. Petr Pham|
|Rok:||2019 - letní|
|Vedoucí:|| doc. PhDr. Martin Gregor Ph.D.
|Typ práce:|| Bakalářská
|Abstrakt:||The goal of this thesis is to examine the use of evaluative voting in the Board of the Cinematography Fund,
which is responsible for the public subsidies in the film industry. A dataset covering results of calls for
support in the period of 2013–2017 is used. A logistic regression model is constructed to assess the
probability to succeed in such a call. Potential extent of manipulation among members of the Board is
analysed with game theoretic approach, where agents misreport their true preferences. The results of this
thesis are in line with the literature on social choice theory and suggest a great susceptibility to exploitation
in the committee.