To Close a Deal or not to Close a Deal? Expecting the Collapse of Constitution and Process of its Acceptance
|Year:||2005 - summer|
|Leaders:|| doc. PhDr. Martin Gregor Ph.D.
|Work type:|| Bachelors
|Awards and prizes:|
|Abstract:||”To Close a Deal or not to Close a Deal? Expecting the Collapse of Constitution and Process of its Acceptance” is a contribution to the discussion on rationality of creation of contracts between two players.
First part of presented model describes initiatives for giving a birth to a contract and quantifies the savings from that contract. Next step is loosening the assumptions on perfect enforceability of contracts and is searching for methods for players they can use to prevent the violating of contract.
In the last chapter the costs of initiating the action of enforcer are introduced. Model shows that without private production of defense players don’t have means to prevent violating constitution. The last part describes the systems of contracts with the costs negotiation present and tries to find the configuration of contracts that is the cheapest for the players.