| Abstract: |
Abstract in English This paper is focused on comparing two methods of public service delivery. Specifically, it is a reaction to the contemporary trend concerning the shift from conventional government purchase and ownership of assets toward public-private partnerships (PPP). The paper examines the cases when it is more efficient for a government agency to choose the conventional method of public service delivery and when it pays off to use the PPP model, i.e. purchase of final services, leaving the private sector supplier to design, build and finance the assets. Results of this study should help to disprove the mistaken belief that the currently very popular PPP model is a “miraculous” solution for each type of a public project. The approach emphasizes the informational and contractual nature of the problem. By creating a suitable contract, or more precisely contractual incentives, the government agency tries to ensure effective public service delivery in the future. The analysis by itself then consists in comparing the incentives creation costs. The government agency prefers the method of public service delivery which enables cheaper implementation of incentive scheme. Other criteria influencing the government agency’s choice are out of this thesis’ range. |
