DOES ENFORCEMENT OF THE RULES AGAINST FOREIGN BRIBERY DISCOURAGE EXPORTS? A CASE OF THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION
DOES ENFORCEMENT OF THE RULES AGAINST FOREIGN BRIBERY DISCOURAGE EXPORTS? A CASE OF THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION
| Authors: | PhDr. Jaromír Baxa Ph.D. Mgr. Eva Michalíková Mgr. Michal Paulus |
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| Type: | IES Working Papers |
| Year: | 2020 |
| Number: | 28 |
| ISSN / ISBN: | |
| Published in: | IES Working Papers 28/2020 |
| Publishing place: | Prague |
| Keywords: | Corruption, International trade, Gravity model |
| JEL codes: | F13, F14, F53 |
| Suggested citation: | Paulus M., Baxa J., Michalíková E. (2020): "Does Enforcement Of the Rules Against Foreign Bribery Discourage Exports? A Case of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention" IES Working Papers 28/2020. IES FSV. Charles University. |
| Abstract: | Although the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention has been signed by dozens of countries, only some of themenforce the laws against foreign bribery. To estimate whether the enforcement deters exports, we use amicrofounded gravity model of bilateral trade flows of 132 countries. Our results imply that enforcement ofthe rules decreases the export flows to countries with a higher corruption distance significantly, particularlyin product categories characterized by differentiated goods. Moreover, the effects of the host-countrycorruption on exports of the nonenforcing countries are limited, and similar to the impact on the exports from countries that did not sign the Convention at all. Therefore, the main aim of the Convention to level the field in international trade has not been reached yet, even among the signatory countries. |
| Download: | wp_2020_28_paulus_baxa_michalikova.pdf |
