Research seminar: Ulrich Schäfer (University of Vienna)

We would like to invite you to a research seminar by Ulrich Schäfer, Associate Professor of Managerial Accounting at the University of Vienna.

Title: Information Leaks and Voluntary Disclosure
Authors: Michael Ebert (University of Paderborn), Ulrich Schäfer (University of Vienna) and Georg Schneider (University of Graz)

Abstract: We study managers’ decisions to disclose information to the capital market when they face a risk of information leakage. Our analysis offers three main insights. First, we find that leaks that are less informative create market discipline and motivate more voluntary disclosure. Second, an increasing likelihood of information leakage has ambiguous effects. It fosters market discipline but increases managers’ rewards from successful non-disclosure. Consequently, a higher likelihood of leakage impedes disclosure if leaks represent rare events and fosters voluntary disclosure if leaks are sufficiently probable. Third, we find that market discipline is more effective for myopic managers who focus on short-term prices and cannot react to information leaks on a timely basis. Such managers are willing to preempt information leakage and to disclose their private information.

The seminar will take place on Wednesday, June 5, in Room 105 at 11:00.

The full paper is available here.

If you need a discussion slot with Dr. Schäfer, please write to Martin Gregor, and he will try to find a suitable time.

The list of all research seminars at IES (past and forthcoming) is available at: https://ies.fsv.cuni.cz/en/research/research-seminars